How is it Possible That a Container Ship Collided with a USN Destroyer Near Japan?

[MicCanberra]

I found it an interesting article.

[chengkp75]

That article gave me chills. I don't think cruise ships traverse the type of channel described. I've watched from the aft as our ship backed into Mahogany Bay and marveled at the control it took and the skill that must be involved, all in broad daylight, barely moving.

 

Going back to the first post expressing incredulity that this could happen, I initially shared that feeling. This article left me amazed it doesn't happen more often.

 

Again, my condolences to the families and shipmates of the lost crew.

 

Actually, cruise ships traverse the kinds of channels described all the time. Most ports and routing choke points have "traffic separation schemes" (the "shipping channel" in the article, but they have quite a lot of "exceptions" to the strict rules: fishing boats, ferries, pleasure craft), but the approaches are wide open to however the Captain of the vessel wants to approach the scheme. These are at all major ports, the approaches to the canals, Dover straits, Gibraltar, Strait of Malacca, Danish straits, etc, etc. Each and every one of these has a vast amount of traffic around, entering, leaving, anchoring, drifting, fishing, whatever.

 

And the author is looking at it from a Navy perspective, where there is a team of several people (10-12 depending on the ship type) assigned to a bridge watch, while a cargo vessel will have 2-3 total, and typically no one awake in the engine room. Engine rooms have been automated for decades, so that it is manned only between 0800-1700.

 

Even a cruise ship's bridge at night is only manned by two watch officers, and two ratings.

[bury me at sea]

Actually, cruise ships traverse the kinds of channels described all the time.

 

Oh my. I always give so much weight to your input. This is just scary.

 

Thank you for your direct reply.

[TheOldBear]

Actually, cruise ships traverse the kinds of channels described all the time. Most ports and routing choke points have "traffic separation schemes" (the "shipping channel" in the article, but they have quite a lot of "exceptions" to the strict rules: fishing boats, ferries, pleasure craft), but the approaches are wide open to however the Captain of the vessel wants to approach the scheme. These are at all major ports, the approaches to the canals, Dover straits, Gibraltar, Strait of Malacca, Danish straits, etc, etc. Each and every one of these has a vast amount of traffic around, entering, leaving, anchoring, drifting, fishing, whatever.

 

And the author is looking at it from a Navy perspective, where there is a team of several people (10-12 depending on the ship type) assigned to a bridge watch, while a cargo vessel will have 2-3 total, and typically no one awake in the engine room. Engine rooms have been automated for decades, so that it is manned only between 0800-1700.

 

Even a cruise ship's bridge at night is only manned by two watch officers, and two ratings.

It's been about 40 years since I last stood a watch as OOD, but Perry class frigates did not have that many folks on the bridge watch - even for "Sea and Anchor" detail.

 

For 'independent steaming', I recall on the bridge

• The OOD [me]
  
• Helmsman
  
• 2 lookouts [mostly on the bridge wings, sometimes one would be stationed on top of or aft of the helo hanger
  
• A "messenger of the watch" - shared with CIC
  

CIC would have 3-4 folks on duty, and Main Control was manned [2 watch standers + 2 'sounding and security' on patrol below decks] but I found MC watches a valuable time for paperwork - little to do unless something broke.

The Captain frequently slept in his chair [The only chair. Perry class FFG's originally had a second chair for the helmsman, but this was removed to honor tradition on most ships]

[navybankerteacher]

 

...

 

And the author is looking at it from a Navy perspective, where there is a team of several people (10-12 depending on the ship type) assigned to a bridge watch, while a cargo vessel will have 2-3 total, and typically no one awake in the engine room. Engine rooms have been automated for decades, so that it is manned only between 0800-1700.

 

Even a cruise ship's bridge at night is only manned by two watch officers, and two ratings.

 

I never heard of a destroyer having more than six or so on a regular underway bridge watch - including the lookouts on the port and starboard wings, respectively.

 

Perhaps more if special sea and anchor detail or ASW operations were set - but neither seems likely in this case.

[chengkp75]

I am including the CIC watch, in the numbers of those watching for outside interactions.

[Mcdonaldbam]

Correction to

"One 'Oh S---' makes up for a dozen 'Atta Boys'".

 

 

One Oh S---- WIPES OUT a dozen atta boys. It takes a boatload of atta boys to overcome an Oh S----.

[nybumpkin]

Here's a USNI article on what the investigators now think may have happened, although the investigation is ongoing. They think ACX Crystal was on autopilot and the watch was "inattentive or asleep." What's scary is that Crystal's crew didn't realize they hit something for about a half hour after the collision. https://news.usni.org/2017/06/21/investigators-believe-uss-fitzgerald-crew-fought-flooding-for-an-hour-before-distress-call-reached-help

 

It doesn't explain why Ftz's watch didn't react to Crystal's approach, though.

[mnocket]

Here's another report of what the investigators have found. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/freighter-autopilot-hit-us-destroyer/

 

There seems to be agreement an two key elements.....

 

 

1) The container ship was on autopilot and the bridge was unmanned.

 

 

2) The Fitz crew didn't "see" the container ship approaching.

 

 

On the first point (just my observation, I'm not an expert) - It seems the Navy and maritime worlds haven't kept up with technological advances in collision avoidance. It seems the ACX Crystal's autopilot knows enough to sound an alarm if it detects a collision course, but not enough to avoid the collision. I'm guessing the alarm is useless if there's no one on the bridge to hear it? As for collision avoidance...... look at how far self-driving cars have come in the last five years and compare it to ship autopilot systems. Why have these systems never progressed beyond primitive "maintain heading & speed"?

 

 

On the second point - How is it possible (yes I know it is, it happened, but how?) that something the size of a container ship can maintain a steady collision course with a USN ship without it being aware of the threat and taking evasive action? This goes back to my original post which posited "The only plausible explanation is that the bridge crew on both ships weren't paying attention for an extended period of time." Can there be any other explanation?

[NurseDave]

Here's another report of what the investigators have found. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/freighter-autopilot-hit-us-destroyer/

 

There seems to be agreement an two key elements.....

 

 

1) The container ship was on autopilot and the bridge was unmanned.

 

 

2) The Fitz crew didn't "see" the container ship approaching.

 

 

On the first point (just my observation, I'm not an expert) - It seems the Navy and maritime worlds haven't kept up with technological advances in collision avoidance. It seems the ACX Crystal's autopilot knows enough to sound an alarm if it detects a collision course, but not enough to avoid the collision. I'm guessing the alarm is useless if there's no one on the bridge to hear it? As for collision avoidance...... look at how far self-driving cars have come in the last five years and compare it to ship autopilot systems. Why have these systems never progressed beyond primitive "maintain heading & speed"?

 

 

On the second point - How is it possible (yes I know it is, it happened, but how?) that something the size of a container ship can maintain a steady collision course with a USN ship without it being aware of the threat and taking evasive action? This goes back to my original post which posited "The only plausible explanation is that the bridge crew on both ships weren't paying attention for an extended period of time." Can there be any other explanation?

 

Would the Navy ship not have some type of an audible alarm like airplanes when the radar senses something on a track that will bring it within a set distance?

[chengkp75]

Here's another report of what the investigators have found. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/freighter-autopilot-hit-us-destroyer/

 

There seems to be agreement an two key elements.....

 

 

1) The container ship was on autopilot and the bridge was unmanned.

 

 

2) The Fitz crew didn't "see" the container ship approaching.

 

 

On the first point (just my observation, I'm not an expert) - It seems the Navy and maritime worlds haven't kept up with technological advances in collision avoidance. It seems the ACX Crystal's autopilot knows enough to sound an alarm if it detects a collision course, but not enough to avoid the collision. I'm guessing the alarm is useless if there's no one on the bridge to hear it? As for collision avoidance...... look at how far self-driving cars have come in the last five years and compare it to ship autopilot systems. Why have these systems never progressed beyond primitive "maintain heading & speed"?

 

 

On the second point - How is it possible (yes I know it is, it happened, but how?) that something the size of a container ship can maintain a steady collision course with a USN ship without it being aware of the threat and taking evasive action? This goes back to my original post which posited "The only plausible explanation is that the bridge crew on both ships weren't paying attention for an extended period of time." Can there be any other explanation?

 

I don't see where it says the Crystal's bridge was "unmanned" as you say. It says, "no crew member was manning the controls in the pilot house", which would be correct if the ship was on autopilot or track plot. The bridge watch would not be manning the controls like a military ship does. The bridge watch officer could have been at the chart table (the after part of the bridge) filling out the logbook, or plotting a position, about 20' away from "the controls".

I'm not saying there wasn't inattention on both bridges, but I seriously doubt the bridge was unmanned, due to the BNWAS requirement I've mentioned. Given that the Fitzgerald actually weighs (displacement) less than 1/4 of the deadweight (cargo weight) of the Crystal, it is not surprising that the ship did not feel a great amount of impact when giving the Fitzgerald a glancing blow. It is typically difficult to find the displacement of cargo vessels, and I find it interesting that while searching for it, I found many sources claiming the Crystal had a "displacement" of 29,000 tons, which even a maritime source like "gCaptain" quoted, but this is the gross tonnage. If the ship had a displacement of only 29,000 tons, how does it have a deadweight of 39,000 tons? I would guess that the Crystal has a displacement of around 65-70,000 tons, when loaded, or 6-7 times the weight of the Fitzgerald.

One thing I have heard as a complaint from bridge officers is that virtually every alarm on the bridge, from whatever source or system, has the exact same tone, so it is difficult at times to find out what is actually alarming on a dark bridge at night.

Track pilot systems and even simple radar displays will give proximity alarms, but these can be set for very small CPA's (closest point of approach), as to be useless if so desired.

[MicCanberra]

LOL, even I have sat in a captain's chair. :)

[mnocket]

I don't see where it says the Crystal's bridge was "unmanned" as you say. It says, "no crew member was manning the controls in the pilot house", which would be correct if the ship was on autopilot or track plot. The bridge watch would not be manning the controls like a military ship does. The bridge watch officer could have been at the chart table (the after part of the bridge) filling out the logbook, or plotting a position, about 20' away from "the controls".

 

I guess I got that idea from the following quote..... "Watkins said the fact that the merchant ship hit something and did not radio the coast guard for almost 30 minutes also indicates no one was on the bridge at the time of the collision."

 

Now that I read it more carefully, it's speculation and, if as you say someone could be on the bridge at the time of the collision and not be aware of the collision (or 90 degree to starboard course deviation), then the speculation is clearly misplaced.

[chengkp75]

One thing I have heard as a complaint from bridge officers is that virtually every alarm on the bridge, from whatever source or system, has the exact same tone, so it is difficult at times to find out what is actually alarming on a dark bridge at night.

 

 

a reminder that C's comments are from an engineer ... not one who works on 'the bridge' or has ever sat in the Captain chair (except when the Captain wasn't around)

 

Ah, another day and another opportunity to show your disdain for engineers, or anyone who has not held the holy authority or awesome responsibility of being a ship's Captain. Sorry, while I agree that the Captain's job carries far more responsibility than mine, many of my best friends are Captains, and they take their authority and responsibility as humbly as possible.

 

Now, where in my posts on this thread have I mentioned either Captain's responsibilities or actions? Just to check, went back and looked, and nope, not once, so your comments about "sitting in the Captain's chair" are just churlish. I even agreed with you before you took your cheap shot the first time.

 

In 42 years, I have spent many, many evening or morning watches on the bridge as the ship's management team (Captain, Chief, Chief Mate and First Engineer) discuss upcoming operations or plan maintenance, having a cup of coffee, or just watching the sun rise or set (probably 8-10/week). No, I don't work on the bridge, but I've spent hundreds (thousands) of hours there observing, which is way more than I've ever seen a Captain come to the ECR to see operations or equipment, or even for a chat.

 

So, lets give it a rest, and you can post your viewpoint, and I can post mine.

[CPT Trips]

Chief,

Hope the like button sounds different :)

[Aquahound]

So, lets give it a rest, and you can post your viewpoint, and I can post mine.

 

Don't let him get to you. Just imagine the poor crews that had to work for him! :eek:

[broberts]

One thing I have heard as a complaint from bridge officers is that virtually every alarm on the bridge, from whatever source or system, has the exact same tone, so it is difficult at times to find out what is actually alarming on a dark bridge at night.

 

 

a reminder that C's comments are from an engineer ... not one who works on 'the bridge' or has ever sat in the Captain chair (except when the Captain wasn't around)

 

Seems to me that comments heard are no more nor less valid depending on the ears.

[iancal]

Why not wait for the facts and for the outcome of the investigation?

[LA_CA_GAL]

Why not wait for the facts and for the outcome of the investigation?

 

Good suggestion, like that's gonna happen.

 

[navybankerteacher]

Well, since matters, such as lanyards, are seen as fit for endless discussion, I believe collisions at sea are similarly relevant.

 

From the indicated track of Crystal, it appears that she and Fitzgerald were on reciprocal courses - apparently bound to pass starboard to starboard close aboard. Crystal apparently made a sharp turn to starboard - possibly because of some error in her autopilot - then she returned to original course for a half hour before returning to point of collision - where Fitzgerald remained dead in the water due to damage caused by flooding.

 

Fitzgerald's flooding must have been caused by Crystal's underwater bow protrusion - which must have been the first point of impact. That impact would have swung Fitzgerald sharply to port - which explains why Crustal's upper port bow would have struck Fitzgerald's starboard superstructure.

 

This does not explain why Fitzgerald allowed such a close head on passing to develop - but the OOD would have seen Crystal's starboard running light - indicating a starboard to starboard passing - which would have been fine given a somewhat wider passage.

 

It would seem the OOD overestimated the closest point of approach - which, while not good shiphandling, might not have resulted in collision had Crystal not suddenly turned right (to starboard) at the last minute.

[MicCanberra]

Good suggestion, like that's gonna happen.

 

Agreed, we can speculate on this for months waiting for the outcome.

[broberts]

...

From the indicated track of Crystal, it appears that she and Fitzgerald were on reciprocal courses - apparently bound to pass starboard to starboard close aboard. Crystal apparently made a sharp turn to starboard - possibly because of some error in her autopilot - then she returned to original course for a half hour before returning to point of collision - where Fitzgerald remained dead in the water due to damage caused by flooding.

 

....

 

I don't believe it has been established that the ships were on reciprocal courses. (Damage to the Fitzgerald was on the starboard side and to Crystal on the port side.)

 

Given current thinking on the timeline, the sharp starboard turn seems more likely some sort of collision avoidance attempt or reaction to the collision.

[NurseDave]

Agreed, we can speculate on this for months waiting for the outcome.

 

 

 

Would rather read about this than chair hog yet again.

 

 

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[whogo]

(sorry for a cheap shot, but chengkp75 .. you hold an engineer ticket? ... don't work on the bridge? ... the place with windows where you look out and see the world? I appreciate your comments, most of the time .... but so far as ship handling and the interpretations of International Rules of the Road your qual's are? Does your ticket put you on the bridge, dealing with ship handling or rules situations?????

Nice of you to apologize in advance for the cheap shots.

[rkacruiser]

From what I have learned, the lives of those sailors who were lost may have been due to the watertight doors being shut as their berthing compartment flooded. I find that very tragic. At what cost is it important to save the ship when these 7 sailors might have been saved?

 

From one account I read, one surviving sailor in that compartment attempted to save his bunk mates who perished. Why was his efforts cut short other than his own physical capabilities being exhausted? Was the closing of the watertight doors responsible for this?

 

I grieve for these men. If conscious, these men may have faced the horrors that those whose cabins on the Andrea Doria must have faced as their cabins rapidly flooded after the collision with the Stockholm.

Edited June 25, 2017 by rkacruiser