Technical Fire Discussion

[LadyRx]

Thanks for the link, W0kie. There were several pictures that I haven't viewed before.

[Druke I]

Wokie

 

Thanks for the photo share.

 

Fire on a ship - very scary.

 

Four years ago, (8-02) in Venice, on Golden Princess's trans-Atlantic, a ship (don't recall name) alongside of us at next pier had a fire in its funnel system, (similar to a chimney fire!) with lots of smoke - very quick response from landbased fire departments & ship's company. It did not appear to be much more than cosmetic damage - but still, scary.

[Tater1800]

Wokie,

Feel free to add these to the collection. These were not processed before posting. I have a few tiffs of the boat shot from accross the bay also.

 

 

 

[Twinsmomct]

After you view these pictures, I'd be curious to hear what you guys think. These were posted on another Princess thread.

http://www.barcagii.com/photos.php?catid=8

[meemeec]

Wow, amazing pictures!! Thanks for posting the link.

[zackiedawg]

Excellent and revealing photos - finally some nice shots of the interior of the rooms! Here's what I see on quick review of those photos:

 

1. The blue matting can be partially vindicated. It does not appear to have burned easily, and likely only burned completely in places where the heat from the fire was overwhelming. It would appear that this matting material is reasonably fire retardant.

 

2. The dividers between cabins don't appear to be aluminum. The way they burned and melted, they appear to have been made of plastics, with possibly a fiberglass core. They seem to have burned completely in most balconies, and in the few that are partially burned, they show a heavy melting pattern which looks much more like plastic than aluminum...and appears to have had a fire resistance much lower than aluminum.

 

3. The kick plates seem to have been plexiglas or plastic-resin based, and may have contributed to the intensity of the fire.

 

4. The cabins damaged inside are predominantly from smoke and residue damage as opposed to fire. There are shots of one or two cabins which have significant fire damage, down to the bedframes, but most of them are significantly blackened from smoke and residue. Fire damage is mostly relegated to the sections of cabin closest to the balcony doors, and on the upper walls and roof, with little or no damage along the lower walls, baseboards, or floors. This is more indicative of a fire that intruded on the interiors after the balcony doors gave out from the fire outside.

 

5. There are shots of a cushion from a recliner sitting on a balcony which is unburned, but has large burn holes bored through it. This looks like a fire resistant material which was dripped on by a highly flammable liquid such as melted plastics. Burning plastic becomes a highly viscous burning liquid, which would have been dripping down from the burning decks above. More flammable materials would have likely burned more completely...but because the cushions on that balcony below the fire weren't exposed to the full heat of the fire, it only burned where dripped on. This could have been burning debris or solids as well - but usually those would leave blackening around the holes and more ragged burn patterns.

 

6. The sprinklers/fire suppression system did a wonderful job - few cabins suffered more than smoke and water damage - most show an initial intrusion of fire from the outside, charring the upper walls, but extinguishing the fire before spreading throughout the cabins. The type of smoke produced from these plastics and resins would be highly toxic, have extremely heavy carbon, and would leave a heavy, tarry residue. The smoke damage on the bedsheets seems to indicate this type of smoke intrusion. Only in the worst-burned cabins does the smoke appear to have significantly escaped into the inner hallways, and appears to have been fairly rapidly suppressed when it did.

[ccrain]

The severly burned out cabin has my interest peaked. Unlike some of the other cabins photographed it had intense heat inside the cabin to incinerate the mattress and cause the ceiling to buckle. The other cabins indicate intrusion from the outside, but likely stopped by the fire suppression system.

 

The damage inside that one cabin is causing me to rethink the whole source aspect of the fire - or was the fire suppression system in that cabin on the fritz.

 

I still think its amazing the casulties were so low.

[katisdale]

After seeing the bedsprings picture I will never go to sleep with the balcony door open. I want the few extra minutes that door might afford me.

[ATL-Cpl]

2. The dividers between cabins don't appear to be aluminum. The way they burned and melted, they appear to have been made of plastics, with possibly a fiberglass core. They seem to have burned completely in most balconies, and in the few that are partially burned, they show a heavy melting pattern which looks much more like plastic than aluminum...and appears to have had a fire resistance much lower than aluminum.

The dividers are a composite resin, very light and translucent, about 1/4 in thick. The frames are square extruded aluminum tubes that have a wall thickness of about 3/16 to 1/4 inch. There is a lock/hinge assembly on the inside panel that allows that panel to swing open to allow people to walk between the balconies.

[Princess Chatterer]

Wokie,

Feel free to add these to the collection.

 

Done

[captlou]

Twinsmomct - Thank you for the link. Fire is a frightening thing!

 

Zackiedawg - Thank you for your insights into the photos. It kind of goes along with the original "theory" here that the fire started and grew on the balconies.

[zackiedawg]

The severly burned out cabin has my interest peaked. Unlike some of the other cabins photographed it had intense heat inside the cabin to incinerate the mattress and cause the ceiling to buckle. The other cabins indicate intrusion from the outside, but likely stopped by the fire suppression system...The damage inside that one cabin is causing me to rethink the whole source aspect of the fire - or was the fire suppression system in that cabin on the fritz.

 

Just a theory - but the severely damaged room could be located near the center of the burn area, on Caribe deck, where the completely collapsed balconies from the upper two decks collapsed down onto their balconies. These rooms may have faced a hotter and more intense fire due to the fall of debris, and could have had their balcony doors shattered quickly by the burning debris, allowing the fire to jump into the rooms at full intensity rather than build up to their balcony and heat their way in. Also, it is hard to tell what type of cabin that is, but a minisuite or suite may burn worse than the smaller cabins because of the extra space that must be filled by the suppression system - it may take longer to quell the fire in a larger room, allowing it to cause more damage.

 

The reason I am still just a bit dubious on the fire starting inside the cabin is because it would seem much more likely for the fire to have spread from cabin to cabin through the walls and roof - especially if it started in that room and was capable of growing to that intensity without being suppressed by the sprinklers.

 

But certainly that is for the inspectors on-board to conclude the final outcome!

 

The dividers are a composite resin, very light and translucent, about 1/4 in thick. The frames are square extruded aluminum tubes that have a wall thickness of about 3/16 to 1/4 inch. There is a lock/hinge assembly on the inside panel that allows that panel to swing open to allow people to walk between the balconies

 

Thanks for the info - that's what I was thinking from the pictures. Some have stated that the dividers were aluminum, and I've never been on this class of Princess ship, so I couldn't verify or deny this. I was trying to remember what was on the Coral Princess, and I seem to remember an opaque whitish plastic. The way those dividers melted looked like plastic, and that material would certainly burn very hot and emit the type of smoke and residue visible throughout the smoke-damaged cabins.

 

Zackiedawg - Thank you for your insights into the photos. It kind of goes along with the original "theory" here that the fire started and grew on the balconies.

 

CaptLou...No problem - I like that this thread has remained about theories, observations, and discussion in a very civil manner. I still believe more in the balcony-started fire theory than the in-cabin-started theory...but it remains just that - a theory. Until the inspectors who are on scene and are professionally trained to detect the fire's origin come out with a report on the issue, I'll stick with my theory. If the inspectors reveal that the fire started inside a cabin, or was started with a molotov cocktail, or that the ship was struck by a RPG from a group of terrorists out of Cuba - I will concede and admit I was off-base. It seems logical...I can envision how it is possible for the fire to have started from a cigarette on a balcony...but just because it is possible for it to have happened that way doesn't mean it DID happen that way. It will be very interesting to see what the REAL inspectors come up with!

 

It certainly has been like a live detective novel - and has been as gripping as reading a good book or watching a show...getting to weigh the limited evidence, analyze the photographs and eyewitness reports, and attempt to draw a logical conclusion as to what may have happened before the final plot is revealed!

[Host CJSKIDS]

I can tell you that the fire cracked our sliding door in our suite on caribe, I guess the heat was just too much. The doors cracked, not shattered, but I would assume that was quickly behind. The heat was intense already in C414 by 3:10 am and the balcony on complete fire. We could hear what sounded like an explosion and must have been the wall between our suite and the next suite burst. Then you heard a wooshing, (I'm sure I spelled that incorrectly!) and the fire spread.

 

It's been very interesting to read these posts and I thank those who have knowledge for sharing it with us.

[katisdale]

On the MAIB site it now indicates that a full (rather than preliminary) investigation is in process. So far I have been impressed with how they are handling the investigation (asking for information from cruisers, getting experts on board quickly etc.).

[captlou]

Zackiedawg - It's funny, but as I was reading your latest post I thought, "Hmmm, we've all watched too many shows that solve crimes through forensic evidence." My latest favorite is NCIS.

 

Good to hear that a full investigation is under way. It makes sense for them to find out why and how it started and escalated into a major fire. That way, they can make changes that will make us all safer in the future.

 

Still, if the fire did start on a balcony, it's pretty amazing how it was contained as well as it was. Imagine if the fire spread into the ship's interior instead of just a few staterooms. From the eye witness reports, the crew performed admirably.

[duke052]

A week os so after the fire a Boston news station interviewed a couple from NH who were on the ship.They believe they were in the cabin next to where the fire started. There was a lot of yelling in the cabin next to theirs and at one point they heard someone yell "put it out " Not long after this the alarms went off. I saw a early photo taken by a passenger which showed three balconies on fire,one above the other. It looked like the largest ball of flame was coming out of the top cabin [ of the 3 ] It looked like the curtain was burning as the flame was from the top part of the slider. Just an observation on my part and I am learning a lot reading this thread. It cannot be said enough that the crew did an unbelievable job saving this ship and thousands of lives. Time Magazine take note. We were on the Star in Dec and we saw the fire crew going thru drills three times. It paid off in a very big way.

[Host CJSKIDS]

A week os so after the fire a Boston news station interviewed a couple from NH who were on the ship.They believe they were in the cabin next to where the fire started. There was a lot of yelling in the cabin next to theirs and at one point they heard someone yell "put it out " Not long after this the alarms went off. I saw a early photo taken by a passenger which showed three balconies on fire,one above the other. It looked like the largest ball of flame was coming out of the top cabin [ of the 3 ] It looked like the curtain was burning as the flame was from the top part of the slider. Just an observation on my part and I am learning a lot reading this thread. It cannot be said enough that the crew did an unbelievable job saving this ship and thousands of lives. Time Magazine take note. We were on the Star in Dec and we saw the fire crew going thru drills three times. It paid off in a very big way.

 

Do you remember where you saw this photo?

 

I wonder if they've interviewed those people in the cabin next door. If they did indeed yell "put it out" then something they had done had caused a fire. I wonder if it was on the balcony or inside. I guess we'll find out in the fall when the report gets published.

[meemeec]

These pictures were posted on another thread of the Star being repaired.

http://www.essorg.de/sp/

[mii]

These pictures were posted on another thread of the Star being repaired.

http://www.essorg.de/sp/

 

Graeat pics. Thanks for sharing.

 

Marilyn

[katisdale]

I am amazed at the progress I seem to see in these photos. The scaffolding was put up very quickly.

[Old Sea Legs]

And so it is now official - - Princess has confirmed that the fire began on a balcony. However, "no definitive cause of the fire has yet been determined. "

[meemeec]

I just found this interesting report. I have also posted it on the main board.

 

http://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=198150

 

Thursday 27 April 2006 00:01

Department for Transport (National)

 

FIRE ON BOARD THE STAR PRINCESS - MAIB ISSUES SAFETY BULLETIN

 

 

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has today issued a Safety Bulletin in connection with a fire that broke out on the Bermudan-registered cruise ship Star Princess while it was on passage from Grand Cayman to Montego Bay, Jamaica on 23 March 2006. There were 2,690 passengers and 1,123 crew on board.

The seat of the fire was on an external balcony sited on deck 10 of the vessel's port side. The fire spread rapidly along adjacent balconies and within ten minutes had spread to decks above. It also spread internally. One passenger died as the result of smoke inhalation and 13 others were treated for the effects of smoke.

The cause of the fire has yet to be determined and the MAIB is continuing its investigation on behalf of the Bermuda Maritime Administration in cooperation with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

However, the investigation has already identified serious shortcomings in fire protection on ships' balconies which require urgent attention. The MAIB and its partners, therefore, have worked with the cruise industry world-wide to ensure that short-term measures are immediately put in place to safeguard passengers. These include

- increased vigilance on vessels with balconies, with consideration given to dedicated lookouts and additional fire patrols;

- a review of crew onboard training and response;

- advice to passengers and crew.

The industry has also agreed to implement medium-term structural measures as soon as practical.

The UK's Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents, Stephen Meyer, praised the industry for its speedy response. He said:

"Fires such as this are extremely rare and I am confident that the cruise industry has identified measures to ensure that a similar accident will not happen again. In the meantime we will continue with our investigation and to monitor the implementation of our recommendations."

A copy of the Safety Bulletin, which makes three recommendations, is attached. (Also available in pdf format on http://www.gnn.gov.uk)

Public Enquiries: 020 7944 8300

Department for Transport Website: http://www.dft.gov.uk

MAIB SAFETY BULLETIN 1/2006

Fire on board the Bermuda registered cruise ship

Star Princess

on 23 March 2006

MAIB SAFETY BULLETIN 1/2006

This document, containing safety lessons, has been produced for marine safety purposes only, on the basis of information available to date.

The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 provide for the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents to make recommendations at any time during the course of an investigation if, in his opinion, it is necessary or desirable to do so.

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is carrying out an investigation into the fire on board the Bermuda registered cruise ship Star Princess on 23 March 2006. The MAIB will publish a full report on completion of the investigation.

Stephen Meyer

Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents

This bulletin is also available on our website: http://www.maib.gov.uk

Public Enquiries: 020 7944 3000

INTERNET ADDRESS FOR DFT PRESS NOTICES: http://www.dft.gov.uk

BACKGROUND

At 0309 (UTC+5) on 23 March 2006, a fire was detected on board the cruise ship Star Princess. The ship was on passage from Grand Cayman to Montego Bay, Jamaica, with 2690 passengers and 1123 crew on board. The fire is being investigated by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) on behalf of the Bermuda Maritime Administration, in cooperation with the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the United States' National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

The cause of the fire has yet to be determined. However, the seat of the fire was on an external stateroom balcony sited on deck 10 on the vessel's port side. The fire spread rapidly along adjacent balconies, and within 10 minutes had spread up to decks 11 & 12 and onto stateroom balconies in two adjacent fire zones. It also spread internally as the heat of the fire shattered the glass in stateroom balcony doors, but was contained by the fixed fire-smothering system .tted in each of the staterooms. As the fire progressed, large amounts of dense black smoke were generated from the combustible materials on the balconies, and the polycarbonate balcony partitions. This smoke entered the adjacent staterooms and alleyways, and hampered the evacuation of the passengers. One passenger died as a result of smoke inhalation, and 13 others were treated for the effects of the smoke.

The fire was extinguished about 1.5 hours after it had started. The crew fought the fire with water hoses from adjacent external areas, and from internal alleyways. Difficulty was experienced in reaching the fire due to the construction and partitioning of the balcony areas. A total of 79 cabins were condemned after the fire, and a further 204 were either water or smoke damaged. The damaged area covered 3 vertical fire zones on 5 decks (Figures 1, 2 and 3).

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

ANALYSIS

Following the accident, it has been determined by practical tests that the materials at the seat of the fire were readily ignitable, and that the polycarbonate balcony divisions generated intense heat and copious amounts of dense black smoke as they burned (Figure 4). The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is an internationally agreed convention governing the construction and safety of vessels at sea. SOLAS regulations, as included in Chapter II-2 Construction-Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction, do not, currently, prescribe the combustibility of materials used on external balcony areas, as these are not included within the vessel's fire zones. Similarly, balcony areas on cruise ships are not required to have fixed fire detection or suppression systems, as would be the case in internal areas. Additionally, balcony areas are frequently difficult to monitor due to their inaccessibility. This accident clearly demonstrates the risk of a serious fire starting and quickly spreading in areas not covered by regulation.

The installation of balconies, similar to those on board Star Princess, has become increasingly common in modern passenger vessels. It is vital to ensure that the fire protection arrangements within a ship, such as zoning, are not undermined by lack of appropriate measures externally. Immediate action is therefore required internationally, to address the risk of fire in external areas such as balconies, and to stop the potentially catastrophic spread of any such fire.

ACTIONS TAKEN

The International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) has issued a safety notice (Annex A) to its members and other associations, identifying:

a. Immediate actions to mitigate the risk until the medium term measures have been completed; and

b. Additional actions to be undertaken within 3 months and 6 months, to provide longer term solutions in existing ships.

Figure 4

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Maritime Administration of the United Kingdom is recommended to:

2006/162 Submit a formal request to the forthcoming eighty-first session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 81) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to:

- consider the issue comprehensively, with a view to urgently developing

appropriate amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, to address

hazardous external areas of passenger ships, such as balconies, and

ensure that they meet appropriate standards of fire protection, such as

those currently applicable to internal areas of passenger ships;

- in the interim, issue appropriate urgent guidance on fire protection of

external areas of passenger ships, such as balconies.

Cruise lines and operators/managers of passenger vessels are recommended to:

2006/163 Take urgent action to comply with the measures identified in the ICCL Safety Notice attached at Annex A.

Flag States are recommended to:

2006/164 Urgently review the fire safety integrity of external areas of passenger ships on their Register, to ensure that the immediate and medium-term actions taken in the light of this Safety Bulletin are effective.

April 13, 2006

SAFETY NOTICE

The purpose of this safety notice is to inform ICCL members and, to the extent feasible, other passenger vessel operators, of some of the preliminary indications from the recent balcony fire on the cruise ship STAR PRINCESS. Additionally, this safety notice also urges immediate action.

The investigation, being conducted by the UK's Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) (at the request of the government of Bermuda, the flag state of STAR PRINCESS) also includes representatives of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the United States National Transportation Safety Board (US NTSB). The purpose of the investigation is to determine the cause of the fire. A full report from the MAIB will be available at a later date.

Early indications are that the fire originated on an exterior balcony and quickly spread to other balconies in three main vertical fire zones. The cause of the fire spread is unknown at this time, but the presence of combustible material in the balcony areas is considered to have been a major factor.

This notice is to alert ship owners and ship managers of the potential fire risk on external areas, particularly balcony areas, arising from the use of combustible materials. Such areas typically lack smoke/heat detectors, and difficulty of access potentially makes fire fighting in these areas problematic. These issues combine to raise the risk of high intensity fire spreading rapidly.

In the interim, having met with the investigative authorities concerned, ICCL offers the following safety guidance to the cruise line industry:

2111 Wilson Boulevard - 8th Floor - Arlington, Virginia 22201 (USA)

TEL (703) 522-8463 - FAX (703) 533-3811 - WEB http://www.iccl.org

Annex A

Immediate Action

1. Immediately implement measures to counter the risk of this type of marine casualty such as:

a. Increase vigilance on all vessels with balconies where there may be a presence of combustible materials and the lack of detectors or sprinkler systems. In this respect, the provision of dedicated lookouts and additional fire patrols should be considered.

b. Review the crew's onboard training and response procedures to ensure that the ship's firefighting teams are prepared to respond to a fire occurring in the balcony area.

c. Advise passengers and crew not to leave towels and personal belongings on balconies when they are not in their rooms.

d. Instruct housekeeping staff to place personal articles left on balconies by room occupants back in the room during their last visit of the day to the guest room, and to observe balconies during other visits to the room.

e. Re-emphasize fire safety in communications to passengers, including the distribution of appropriate informational pamphlets.

f. Re-emphasize to passengers the need not to throw any items over a ship's side from balconies or other external areas...

g. Re-emphasize to passengers the hazards of not properly extinguishing smoking materials where smoking is authorized, and never to leave smoking materials unattended.

h. Re-emphasize to crew and passengers the hazards of using unauthorized heating elements such as electrical heating coils used in cups or mugs and open flames such as candles.

Additional Actions

2. Within three months, determine the areas at risk by carrying out a fire risk assessment of external areas, particularly balcony areas. During this assessment the following shall be taken into account:

- Accessibility for fire fighting

- Availability of fixed detection and fire fighting systems

- Structural materials (particularly balcony partitions)

- Chairs, tables and other furniture including any cushions or coverings

- Paints

- Deck or floor mats

- Deck coverings

- Handrails

- Other combustible materials typically present, if any.

3. In accordance with the results of the fire risk assessment, and in consultation with regulatory authorities replace all inappropriate materials on balcony areas with materials that are determined to be acceptable. Replace all combustible balcony dividers on a priority basis and as soon as possible with dividers that are of non-combustible material.

4. A plan to make any replacements of materials should be developed as a final step of the fire risk assessment, with the aim of completing this action within six months from the issue of this safety notice. ICCL will follow-up with member lines regarding their progress. ICCL and member lines will continue to work closely with the investigating authorities to review lessons learned from this incident and to take additional actions as appropriate.

 

 

 

 

Client ref 040

[DonLou]

Thanks for the interesting post, meemeec. I am surprised at how fast this preliminary report was issued. Just to clarify, Deck 10 is Caribe deck.

[meemeec]

Your welcome, DonLou. It's interesting to me that the report seems to really condemn the dividers and one or several of our "experts" on this thread had their suspicions about those.

[SomeBeach]

After reading this report, I think all ships will be undergoing some changes on their balconies in the near future.