chengkp75

To elaborate on what Andy described as the investigations, since the deaths occurred in the Bahamas, Bahamas law enforcement will have done an investigation prior to the ship leaving. As the incident was happening, the Captain was notifying HAL headquarters of the incident. HAL would then have notified the Class society (Lloyds Register) that certifies the safety and seaworthiness of the ship, and they would have sent their local surveyor (most ports have surveyors from nearly all Class societies resident there) to the ship, and he/she would have inspected the site and collected statements, before clearing the vessel to sail. As Andy said, if the equipment was not needed for operation of the vessel (either not critical, or one of two or more redundant equipment), then it will be left alone. In some cases, the Class surveyor may sail with the ship to continue investigation. The surveyor's data, along with crew statements, anything from Bahamas law enforcement, and HAL's internal investigation will be used by the Flag State investigation board.

Yes, the fiberglass is basically for appearance. The three generator exhausts on the port side (aft 3) don't look too bad, the boiler exhaust looks to have taken the worst. They will still use the generators that exhaust on the port side, though they may limit the load on them to reduce exhaust temperature. As for the "aerodynamics" of the funnel, that simply doesn't exist, or matter, they were designed that way to reduce sooting and exhaust on the after decks.

We don't dignify them with a separate term. Pond scum does come to mind.

No, I've opened them both using the electric motor driven pump and the hand operated pump, hundreds of times. I am saying that extreme heat will swell the door in the frame, jamming it. Typically, in a fire scenario, where the door may be heated by the fire, you don't open the door until the fire is out, to maintain the fire boundary. Are you asking about somehow opening the door without hydraulics? If that is the case, then no, they cannot be opened or closed manually. The doors themselves weigh between 3/4 to one metric ton. They cannot be closed without hydraulics either. There is a hydraulic accumulator that stores sufficient fluid under pressure to close the door without electricity.

And, this is why the USPH/CDC is so stringent in their hot tub sanitation requirements. Who monitors or regulates the chlorine level in an AirBnB hot tub?

It was apparently a corrugated steam "flex joint" that blew out. There's another thread on the "explosion".

That's not exactly secret or earth-shaking news. Not only will the Flag State (OVV) investigate, but Class (Lloyd's Registry) as well. They are required by law to investigate any incident on ships of Dutch registry that result in damage over $20,000 or death or injury. However, without knowing Dutch freedom of information laws, whether or not the OVV is released, or when, is something else.

Totally agree. The photos give me a vital clue into the incident. The first picture shows an "expanded" flex joint (which is a corrugated, flexible section of piping that allows for movement between the two sections of machinery) in what looks like a steam heat exchanger. This flex joint most likely was full of water, and this blew out when steam was introduced. There was no fire, but the space filled with hot steam. As you say, Walker makes veiled accusations about the watertight door not operating. This makes perfect sense to me. The hydraulic watertight doors operate with no rubber sealing to make the watertight seal, it relies on hydraulic force to jam the door into a wedge shaped frame. And, the hydraulics are strong enough to "un-jam" the door when it needs to be opened. However, if the door is heated by the steam filling the space, it expands in the wedge frame, increasing the pressure required to open the door, likely above what could be provided by the hydraulic pump. Mr. Walker also states that the workers were not equipped with EEBD, but that is not a common industry practice for nearly all work done in engine rooms, and EEBD's are most common on tankers, but also they are only a few scattered at locations around the engine room, not typically carried by workers to their worksite. He also makes it sound as if HAL is guilty of something for not releasing results of internal investigations, but he doesn't say whether US companies of whatever type have to release this information, or whether that information comes from law enforcement sources, as the Flag State and class investigations equate to. Just more fuel for my disdain for Walker.

Alaska has no state sales tax, but several cruise ports have municipal sales taxes, but it has been my experience that the cities don't bother to collect sales tax from the ships.

What about people standing for long times in a pool makes the pool unhygienic?

State jurisdiction goes out to 3 miles offshore, so tax can be charged until the ship is more than that offshore. Federal jurisdiction, for things like casinos, extends to 12 miles offshore.

Who is "VSP"? Do you mean USPH, because of your comment about a 99% score? USPH does not inspect the machinery of a ship, unless it is galley, laundry, or HVAC equipment, and even then it is only for sanitation, not mechanical condition. The steam system on cruise ships is not a primary, or critical system onboard (typically used for heating hot water, the laundry, and fuel heating), so a failure in that system would not preclude sailing for extended time even without repairs. There will be an inspection by the Class surveyor (typically not USCG since it is not a US flag vessel, and the incident does not affect propulsion or steering), and repairs can be made while underway. Many times a water hammer "explosion" in a steam system can be repaired in a couple of hours with a new gasket and bolts. They are not all that uncommon, though one resulting in death is rare.

You are looking for a "full size" pool, by which I assume you mean a 25 yard pool (most common public pool in US). Think about where the pools are located on cruise ships, up on the highest decks so they are out in the open. A 25 yard pool holds about 250 metric tons of water, and placing that much weight that high on a ship would adversely affect the stability (the ability of the ship to stay upright) of the ship. Additionally, the "free surface effect" (the change in center of gravity as the water sloshes from one side or end to another as the ship moves) further degrades the ship's stability. Finally, the longer the pool, the more likely it is to have water sloshing out of the ends as the ship moves, flooding the open decks and requiring constant make up of tons of fresh water that requires energy to produce from sea water. No cruise ship in operation today has a "full size" pool. Even Titanic's pool was only 30 feet long (about 5-6 body lengths) by 14 feet wide. And, even if the pool was "full size", think about having it used by 2000 people at the same time. Would there be room to swim laps?

Power surges are virtually non-existent on ships. Due to the floating ground (that causes problems with surge protectors) lightning strikes travel through the hull without affecting anything in the electrical system. And the ship doesn't use transformers like the land grid does. None of the ship's electronics are protected by surge protection, and I've been on several ships that have received lightning strikes without any damage to anything electrical.

Diesels will smoke when starting, or when a large load shift happens like thrusters or speed changes

Don't know that they don't have one. I've been on a ship where lightning struck an antenna on the bridge wing while 20 feet away was the massive funnel structure that was 20 feet higher, as the mast was even closer and higher. Mother nature does what she wants.

As others have asked, yes ships get hit by lightning frequently, but due to the maritime grounding system (that thing that makes surge protectors dangerous as well as unnecessary) the current flows through the hull to the sea without harm. But if it strikes the highest point and that point is made of fiberglass, then it will ignite.

There is nothing inherently dangerous about using a non-surge protected power strip, or extension cord on a ship, it is just RCI's rule for passengers. RCI can control crew, they have a much harder time controlling passengers, so they are more restrictive to passengers. Also, crew use company approved, and inspected equipment. Moreover, crew typically use a 220v power strip, which is designed for European use, and has a circuit breaker that interrupts both legs of the power, whereas US power strips only interrupt the "hot" leg, and in a shipboard application, this can lead to continued power to the power strip through the "neutral" leg. This danger, from US consumer power strips when used on a ship, can be why RCI does not want any power strips to be used by passengers.

Known in the US as a 'power strip".

Just know that if the VAT is for something you used or consumed while on the ship or in Europe, you don't get the VAT refunded. Just for purchases that you take out of the EU.

The recommended changes are policed for the various players by various third party auditors now that deficiencies in their practices have been noted by NSIA. For Fincantieri, their ISO certification depends on the ISO auditor agreeing that the changes made are sufficient to prevent a recurrence, and become an new industry standard. For Lloyds, the IACS audits their rules, and will see that the changes are made, and consistent with the findings of NSIA. For Wilhelmsen and Viking, Lloyds will audit their SMS programs to see that the changes are made. All of these third party audits are renewed at least annually, to ensure continued compliance, and to find any further discrepancies from industry best practices. Each player accepts responsibility not for causing the incident, but for having a deficient system or process (their SMS or ISO programs) and responsibility for changing the process. If each player is found to have followed their SMS/ISO/IACS codes, policies, and procedures, and those followed industry best practices, at that time (so, before the incident), then negligence is hard/impossible to prove, and financial responsibility difficult to apportion. Just so you know, loss of things like an ISM certificate (International Safety Management Code, set by the IMO, which requires the companies to set up their individual SMS (Safety Management Systems), results in the ship/company losing its ability to operate ships of the flag nation (so almost a kiss of death for ships or shipowners, as Class certificates are required to be checked by port states before allowing a ship to enter their waters), and the same applies for ISO certificates, as flag states can approve or disapprove of Class societies to survey and certify ships flying their flag. Loss of ISO certification can result in customers taking their shipbuilding business elsewhere, to a competitor that does meet standards. Andy probably has more personal experience with certification at the shoreside level.

Andy, I can't say for sure what Lloyd's would do, but I know that DNV and ABS, the two Class societies I'm familiar with, would have issued a "condition of class" to have the engine repaired by a given date (set in conversation with Wilhelmsen and MAN regarding parts and technician availability), and with the notation that if another engine failed the ship could not sail, or if another engine came due for preventative maintenance that could not be accomplished during port calls, that the ship could not sail. I guess I gave the wrong impression. The report does not seek to assess blame, but there is no reason that Viking could not file civil action against Lloyds, Wilhelmsen, or Fincantieri for breach of contract. I'm not a lawyer, just a simple boat mechanic, but it would depend on how strong a case Viking felt they had as to whether they pursue it (they do share some responsibility as well), in my opinion. Further mitigating the liability of the various players other than Viking, are the facts that it appears that even the IMO bears some responsibility for not promulgating clear procedures for implementing requirements they set in SOLAS. This, to me, shows that "industry standard" was similar to what Lloyds and Fincantieri did with the design of the sump tanks (see the El Faro, mentioned in the report, a much older ship that had similar design problems and was lost due to low oil levels), and so there are likely many ships operating out there today that don't actually meet SOLAS requirements, since no one thought their design philosophy was wrong. The purpose of the recommended actions from the NSIA is to make both Lloyds and the IACS (the governing body for Class societies) make changes in how they approve a design pursuant to SOLAS, and apply this to all existing vessels, so that there may be new operating limitations, or maintenance requirements, to mitigate a potential problem, if an existing ship's sump tanks are found to be non-compliant. As NSIA noted, a flag state can grant an exemption to certain items regarding SOLAS, if a sufficient reason is given, and mediation measures listed in the vessel's certificate of class (seaworthiness document).

Actually, it can, and that is the reason that the hot tubs are super-chlorinated daily. Hot tub piping can develop a bio-film layer, and the legionella bacteria can grow between the bio-film and the piping wall, shielded from the chlorine. The super-chlorination (100ppm) destroys the bio-film, and subjects the legionella to the chlorine.

So, just interested, what is "temp high enough"? Most hot tubs should be 100-104*F, but legionella can grow in water up to 113*F.

Again, the SMS model is not to ascertain responsibility, but to ensure that all parties make changes that keep the incident from happening again. Even if one party, like Fincantieri, don't make what are considered to be "sufficient" changes, the system has checks and balances (mainly relying on the "third party" Class society) that will hopefully cover those shortcomings. That is why flag states are required to approve an entity (like a Class society) to audit the SMS programs of all shipping companies that have ships under their flag. The Class societies are also audited by other "third party" companies to ensure that the Class society meets ISO standards for management of their business (ensuring that adequate requirements are promulgated to ensure safe ships). Nearly all parties have some responsibility for this incident, each one being one of the "holes" in the Swiss cheese, and whether one hole is "bigger" than the others, is relatively irrelevant, as all it requires is for all the holes to line up, regardless of how big the passage through the holes is.