Heidi13

I'm having difficulty understanding how a lower beam, which means a narrower ship has any impact on the ability to navigate low river conditions. It is the draught of a ship that impacts shallow water navigation. The beam of river ships navigating canal locks is determined by the dimensions of the locks. If the Viking ships are built to the maximum size of the locks, which is the case of the ships on the Rhine/Danube, then the competition are operating in different regions. What is the under keel clearance metric that Viking and other river cruise lines use in their SMS. When river levels are low this is a major factor in determining if the Master can sail.

There is no "Proper" way to handle a "Rogue Wave", as the Master or Senior Watchkeeping Officer will take action based on the circumstances. This also assumes the Bridge Team have prior warning and can actually observe the wave prior to impacting the ship. I believe the incident was about 22:40, so even approaching the summer solstice, it would have been dark with visibility further reduced by rain and spray, so I doubt the Bridge Team had any time to react. Last I heard they still haven't installed headlights on ships. Without knowing the facts how can you state this was a wrongful death. Fortunately, Admiralty Law does not consider every accident or incident to involve negligence. We have posted numerous times that expedition cruises carry a higher risk, but in saying that many thousands of pax complete these cruises without incident. Ships are no different to any other mode of transport, or even by walking out your front door, you assume some level of risk. About 10 yrs ago, about 30 people died when a ship sank in the Meddy. Even considering this terrible accident, I am not aware of many pax that consider Meddy cruises as being unsafe. To also put it perspective, in the Meddy, I have experienced a storm where a wave came along the Promenade Deck, ripping away the gangway. Therefore, while cruises to the furthest reaches of the Earth carry additional risks, overall they are still as safe. Handling ships is a complex subject, which varies significantly on the ship design and equipment installed. A single screw ship with a single spade rudder will not handle that well, but ships with multiple screws, thrusters, high lift rudders, azipods, right-angled drive units are all extremely manoeuvrable. When encountering storms, in addition to considering the wave action, you also have to consider the ship design. Some ships with bow visors would not be good candidates to hit a massive wave head on.

As with most tragic accidents, the Titanic sinking and resultant loss of life had numerous causes, most of which are most likely irrelevant to the current incident. As the Chief posted, Classification Societies now provide shipbuilding standards and since they also insure the ships, they have some incentive to get it right. Sorry, that isn't even close, as this would have resulted in the Costa and Carnival CEO's being in jail. Yet again, this incident had multiple failures, especially after contact with the shore. Probably nothing, as the design criteria could be investigated more than the actual building. Decision making, is always easier after the fact, especially by armchair experts. As the Chief noted, both are unrelated. I also note that the competence of the Master and Bridge and Engineering Teams, and the Viking SMS saved both ships, with 1 fatality and minimal injuries. Compare that to the Costa Concordia, which was a much more survivable incident, yet through human error had more loss of life. I learned early in my career at sea that every company pays for safety and training, some pay a little up front, others pay more later. When aboard a ship, pay attention to more than the glitz, look at the working aspects of the ship, get to know the crew, where do the officer come from, etc. You also have some resources on here and other marine related forums where lots of information is available.

Sorry, but this is another incorrect assumption. The IMO Polar Code Chapter 12 requires specific training for all Masters and Deck Officers navigating in polar regions. This requirement was also incorporated into the STCW Code. The Viking Masters and Deck Officers may be new to the Viking ships, but they have the required experience and training to operate in these waters.

To confirm the Chief's information, I have been on a banana boat (reefer) and we rolled 45 degrees either side, for a couple of days when crossing the Indian Ocean.

On the West Coast, I have experienced 55 kt storms in the summer, only difference the wind is predominantly NW'ly, whereas in winter the winds are mostly SE'ly. Also experienced a 70 kt storm in the Tasman Sea in summer. So, as the Chief noted, storms can happen any time.

Thanks, may I suggest that the Chief has also provide excellent information, as he is also a very experienced professional mariner.

Just to clarify regarding the Deck numbers as by indicating Dk 4 & 5 on the Hurtigruten ships, some could assume those are higher decks than the Viking ships. When comparing facilities on ships, by deck number, you first need to identify the owner's deck numbering convention. Most ships start with Deck 1 at the E/R plates or tank top, which is the lowest point. The decks are then numbered consecutively up from the tank top. On most ships, the Uppermost Continuous Deck (UCD) is around Deck 4. Below the UCD are hydraulic water-tight doors, which are not acceptable for passenger spaces, as you must be trained to be in spaces with these doors. Therefore, all pax spaces are on or above the UCD. Viking uses a different numbering standard, with the UCD, being Deck A and Deck 1 is the lowest deck for passengers. On Viking, Deck A is the location of the Medical Centre and is the crew deck with the bow to stern M1/I95. This is consistent on Ocean & Expedition ships Therefore, Deck 4 and 5 on Hurtigruten could be about the same height above the water line as Deck 1 and 2 on Viking. With respect to windows v's portholes, this is the ship owner providing what the average passenger is looking for on a cruise. Seen numerous complaints from pax on older ships with portholes. Will this incident change pax expectations - possibly, but the sad fact it only lasts for a brief period. A classic example is the Costa Concordia, with most pax taking the Muster Drill seriously after the incident, but memories have faded and most are again complaining about the Musters.

The marine industry has implemented changes to safety standards from the learnings of numerous incidents. The learnings are included in SOLAS, Classification Society rules, etc which govern to design. Therefore, if any changes are warranted, it will apply to all future vessels and based on any grandfathering, to existing vessels probably at the next, or future special survey.

The IMO Polar Code requires vessel operating in high latitude to have Polar Ice Class, with the Viking Expedition ships being PC6, if memory is correct. I'm not aware that Viking's Ocean ships have Polar Ice classification, so cannot operate in those waters. Your Princess ships are also not Polar Ice classified, so can no longer cruise to Antarctica. I don't follow IMO changes that closely any more, but I believe the Polar Code came into force about 2018, so your Princess cruise was probably a few years ago.

Rob - It is tough to speculate and we won't know for sure until the AIBN report is published. I have also read a comment from a pax onboard that the impact felt like the ship hit something (they mentioned an iceberg, which clearly wasn't the case). That tends to indicate an order of magnitude higher than the prevailing seas, or a unique set of circumstances. Once the information is known from the Bridge Team, as to what they saw, if anything, since it was at night, and also any CCTV images, hopefully they can determine the cause.

I have seen seas in storm force winds, buckle 1" thick steel plate, as if it was paper. The power of the seas is well beyond comprehension, if you have not actually experienced it. The power of a Rogue Wave is significantly higher than normal heavy weather and has resulted in a number of ships suffering significant structural damage, up to including total loss. While the windows are substantial, they are clearly not designed for this very rare event. To survive that type of impact the the thickness would probably need to be measured in feet, which is clearly impracticable. However, using risk management techniques, while the consequence is clearly significant, the probability is very low. However, they will have met current Flag State and Class requirements. We discussed the risks of Expedition cruising to the furthest reaches of the World a number of months ago. Yes, these are not Caribbean or meddy cruises. Similar to the winter season Northern Lights cruises in the North Atlantic, they carry additional risk from weather, and other factors. Passengers interested in these types of cruises should be responsible for knowing the risk, but I am disappointed that Viking do not publish the potential risks of Expedition cruises, which is not just limited to weather, as remoteness is also an issue, as is using the various toys available on the Viking ships - RHIB's, submarine and kayaks. Looking at the big picture, I also note that over the years, many of these cruises have been completed without incident, and ships before and after Polaris crossed Drake Passage without encountering the same wave. With respect to serious preparation, I doubt there is much more the cruise lines can do other than be upfront with the potential risks. With respect to pax, most can probably spend more time on research on what is involved and the potential risks. Personally, I am comfortable in RHIB's, as I have used them for many years and know the risks. Sitting on the collar is a No_No. Using the kayaks is not something I would even consider due to the water temperature, should you overturn. I probably wouldn't sign-up for the submarine, as a mariner, I prefer to remain on the surface.

Based on the information received to date, the Viking RHIB experienced a failure of the inflatable collar. What caused the failure, to the best of my knowledge, has not been published. Failure of the fabric or the heat welded seams, or even the entire collar separating from the boat would meet the definition of a malfunction. However, if the collar was punctured by an external force, either from a pax, or rock/wood/flotsam/jetsam, this would be classed as human factors rather than malfunction. Therefore, without knowing the facts, we cannot make that determination. Pax reporting the ship was "Rushing" back to Ushuaia is further proof that pax comments are most often unreliable, as I know of no mariner that would use that term. As I have no doubt the Polaris has a prudent Master, I expect she probably used a term such as, "Best speed". I can see why some pax could infer that as rushing, but that couldn't be further from the truth, as "Best Speed" takes into consideration navigational and weather challenges, and the ship's propulsion system, ensuring the passage is navigated safely. You are correct that Rogue Waves don't always break windows, as some have resulted in ships experiencing major structural failure and sinking. Accepting the tragic loss of a pax, the ship was fortunate that it experienced minimal damage, so yet again I question your statement the ship was unable to handle the rogue wave. Whether that was as a result of the design and/or the Bridge Team's actions, we will not know until the final AIBN report is published. Criminal investigation - this isn't newsworthy, as it is a fact of life all mariners have to live with. Almost every jurisdiction jumps at the opportunity to prosecute mariners. Quark Incident - at the time of the incident, the winds were light and seas smooth. The reports state a breaking wave, which can be generated by a number of sources, including wash from other boats. As the boat was close to shore and shallow water, the height of a wave increases. Hardly a "Rogue Wave" The Rogue Wave is a reportable shipping casualty and the Master must report it to the Flag State. Since it includes a fatality and damage to the ship, I expect the AIBN to convene a formal inquiry to determine the facts and causes. This information is published and is available to the public, initially with a preliminary report and then a final report. The preliminary report can take 1 - 2 yrs and the final report 2 - 3+ years.

Provided the pressure relief valves are operating, the inflation collars cannot be over inflated, as each compartment has 1 or more pressure relief valves. When topping off the collars, we continued inflating them until the relief valves let go, which is how they are tested. During annual recertification the pressure relief valves are blocked and the collar is inflated to 2x to 3x the working pressure. Therefore the fabric and heat welded seams are capable of handling significantly more pressure.

Based on the pax reports received, I am not disputing that a pax suffered a broken leg as a result of an RHIB incident. What I am questioning, is the lack of facts provided in the post I copied, that alleges the Viking Zodiac malfunctioned and therefore Viking is liable. Prior to making those allegation, I'll suggest waiting to know what actually happened and also the maintenance records of the boat. Since these inflatable collars are degraded by UV, I suggest where they are stored is also a key issue. Based on the collar pressure, I am suggesting regardless of whether it was a slow leak or large puncture, it is hardly an "Explosion". A large puncture will result in rapid (instant) deflation and since the collar is secured inboard, anyone sitting on the collar will probably end up in the water. I wasn't going to speculate about the becketed lines, but you have a reasonable probability of being correct, as that is definitely a possible contributing factor. Many of the top marine companies have moved on from the "Blame Game" and company post incident investigations are held to determine the root cause and any additional factors, so they can be incorporated into the SMS, to reduce the potential for future incidents. Providing the Master and Officers performed in accordance with the SMS, or where safety and/or pollution was an issue, in accordance with the ordinary practice of seamen, then their performance is not culpable and no disciplinary action is taken. Yes, the Master did not make a split-second decision to return to Ushuaia early and prior to making that decision will have conversed with the company and the local authorities, determining the available options. Once the options are known, the Master makes the decision and advises the company and relevant authorities.

A few comments and explanations: I was one of the first to post that we should wait for the official report from the AIBN, as this was a reportable shipping incident. This is consistent with my posts regarding the Viking Sky. The inflatable collars on RHIB's are made from PVC or PU and are substantial. They are fairly low pressure and are fitted with pressure relief valves to prevent over-pressurisation. During the annual testing and certification, the relief valves are secured and the collars tested to 2x to 3x the working pressure. Therefore, the collars are capable of handling significantly more pressure. The collar also has 3 to 5 compartments, so if 1 fails the others remain inflated. Having used these boats and managed a service station, the only collar failures I know of were caused by punctures, either something sharp on board, or in the water. I'll suggest it is a bit of a stretch to consider a low pressure collar deflation as an explosion. When the doctor advises the Master that they are unable to manage a situation onboard, the Master considers all options and decides what action to take, in accordance with the owner's Safety Management System. The post I copied sure seemed to blame Viking's malfunctioning RHIB for the injury. Ship's speed - with the advent of AIS everyone can see the speed of any ship fitted with an AIS, provided the ship is within the range of a Ship Earth Station. By purchasing a premium plan from Marine Traffic, I could review the ship's track, seeing the weather and speed along the route, and also the live speed of ships not within range of a Ship Earth Station. Sadly many will question the Master's decision to return to Ushuaia, however it will have been made in accordance with the ship's Safety Management System. However, the Master has significant authority with respect to safety, as ISM Code Article 5.2, states the owner must include in the SMS that the Master has the overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding safety and pollution prevention. Therefore, with respect to safety and pollution prevention, the Master can take any decision, even one contrary to the SMS, if in their professional opinion, it is the best course of action. The company is also required to assist the Master regardless of their decision. Having spent almost 30 years as a Master, we make decisions based on the information available at that time, and our experience. After an incident concludes, and more information is available, it is easy to 2nd guess the Master, who only had the initial information available.

Since you have made some damning allegations, I most certainly hope you were aboard the Viking Polaris and specifically the RHIB that experienced an incident, and more importantly are well versed in the actual facts. Can you please enlighten us with the facts that the Zodiac malfunctioned and more specifically it was the fault of Viking, since you allege it was the Zodiac that severely injured a pax. By the nature of their operation, RHIB's carry a higher level of risk and the potential for injury. There is a very good reason the RHIB's are not used as tenders on other ships. You stated, "Lower windows couldn't withstand a storm", which was actually classed as a "Rogue Wave" - big difference. This highly uninformed statement only shows your total lack of understanding of the marine environment. I have seen regular storms buckle 1" thick steel plate, so hardly surprising windows failed from impact of a Rogue Wave. To put it in perspective, over the years a number of ships have sunk from the impact of a rogue wave. You stated, "Hurrying back to get help for the first injured passenger". Yes, it is reported the Master returned to Ushuaia for medical assistance, but at no time has the speed of the ship been mentioned. Please advise what speed the ship was making through the water, and more importantly, under those circumstances, what do you consider as a safe speed? BTW - if the vessel was proceeding too fast for the conditions, the ship would have experienced significant structural damage, probably requiring a drydock visit. The Rogue Wave also hit from the port side, so speed through the water probably had minimal, if any consequence. Please rationalise how meeting a Rogue Wave in Drake Passage could have been impacted by COVID induced labour shortages. The vessel delivery was delayed, only being handed over to the owners and sailing when it was completed and signed off by the Classification Surveyors. This ship had a number of the early sailings cancelled. The Captain is a fully qualified and certified Master Mariner. I fail to see any need to know more about the Master of a vessel that experienced a rare and catastrophic event, managing to navigate the vessel back to sheltered waters without further incident.

This is not surprising, as the cabins are manufactured off-site and installed as complete units onto the deck, and then manoeuvred into place. The cabin bulkheads and deckheads are not structural steel.

The Master cannot sail if the superstructure is not weather tight. It is unlikely they can make permanent repairs to the windows in 5-day, as who knows how many replacement windows are carried onboard. Temporary repairs, with some challenges, can possibly be made in that time frame. However, before they can even contemplate cleaning up and starting repairs, they must wait the arrival of the AIBN staff, who must inspect and record the damage for the investigation. Once the AIBN clear the vessel to make repairs they can seal the superstructure with steel plate. This will be easier if the local ship repair company can provide a barge to work from, some craneage and sufficient steel plate. However, even if Viking can't get outside assistance any reasonable Seaman and Engineer can "Jury Rig" a working platform over the side and some Handy Billys/Block & Tackles to manoeuvre the plate into place. Little tougher with current current HSE requirements, but should still be doable. The onboard Engineers will have a qualified welder. All repairs must be completed to the satisfaction of the attending LR Surveyor, who if satisfied, will issue the Master a "Condition of Class". If a barge and crane is available, cutting, prep, fitting, welding, testing and painting can easily be completed in under 5-days.

Without knowing the scope of repairs required, it is impossible to speculate on the status of the next cruise. The information provided on Octantis stipulated minimal damage, so that could potentially be addressed by the onboard engineers in a couple of days. They clearly have some flooded cabins, but provided the windows are blanked off, the ship can sail with those cabins empty, provided the ship has no other structural damage impacting the water-tight integrity. The Master must follow the decisions of the Class Inspector with respect to being certified safe to sail.

For those of us not actually aboard the RHIB, until we know the facts, may I suggest using a more generic term of a "Zodiac incident" resulted in a pax sustaining a broken leg. An explosion can mean a multitude of things to different people, although I'll suggest most of us consider it a violent reaction that in a confined space, such as a RHIB, would result in greater injuries. I have both used Rigid Hull Inflatable boats (RHIB) from Zodiac and a number of other manufacturers, and managed a large service station for way too many years. RHIB's have way more risks than traditional lifeboats/tenders, which is why they are not used on regular cruises. So injuries have a much higher probability, which is why I trained my crews in these boats almost daily. The collars are pressurised PVC or PU, as most OEM's have moved on from Butyl. The collars are normally low pressure, from memory probably < 5 psi and have pressure relief valves in each compartment of the collar. The collars are also tested to 2x or 3x the working pressure, by blocking the relief valves during the annual test. If somebody punctured the inflatable collar, it is hardly an explosion. I also note on commercial boats, the entire collar will comprise 3 to 5 compartments, so if 1 fails, the remainder remain inflated. Only other potential is the fuel system, which is a closed system from the tank(s) to the outboard(s). I've seen lots of fuel leaks, but not even a fire, and certainly not an explosion, which requires a fuel/air mixture between the LEL & UEL.

That's one of the reasons we prefer Viking, since all pax are > 18, we are considered and treated like adults and discerning travellers. Personally, I don't require a cruise line to advise that Rome is not a port and how far Venice is from which ever berth the ship is assigned. May I suggest, if you require this level of assistance from a cruise line, then Viking probably isn't a good fit.

You and I have also provided some of the meteorological data that was incorporated into that history. Those southern Latitudes can have snotty weather at any time of the year.😁

Best waiting for the AIBN report, but since the winds are predominantly W'ly and the vessel was mostly likely steaming a N'ly course, the port side would be a reasonable guess.

In this part of the World the weather can be this bad at any time of year. Without any land masses, the predominant W'ly winds have nothing to break up the seas.