Heidi13

How I read the report is that the Master, on reviewing the weather reports and condition of the vessel, did not consider that delaying departure was necessary. Since SRtP requirements were not known, the decision to sail, is at the Master's discretion. This is based on experience, feedback from Officers and Pilots, any relevant policies in the SMS and any weather forecasts or pertinent reports. The SMS made no reference to SRtP requirements. I'll suggest the Master and Senior Officers did not have a sufficient working knowledge of the SRtP requirements, so this regulatory requirement was not included in the pre-sailing review. This may surprise a number of pax, as many see the Master and Senior Officers as the resident experts that know everything. Unfortunately, with the complexity and ever changing plethora of International, National & Local Acts & Regulations, this is just not possible. To provide an example, I last studied Shipmaster's Business and Ship Construction back in 1984, when I completed my Masters. Sailing as an operational Master, I was updated on any new/updated relevant regulations by the company. In addition, I maintained a membership in the Nautical Institute, a professional organisation that assisted in promulgating changes. I gained my additional regulatory knowledge from some projects I was assigned. Spent a number of years working for the VP Ops, with regulatory liaison being part of my role and then 2-yrs developing a new Level 2 Fleet Operations SMS. When I started the SMS Project in 2010, I recall reading of SOLAS changes regarding SRtP, but since our ships were all existing prior to it coming into force, I didn't need to research the requirements and include SRtP factors in the sailing decision matrix. The sailing matrix was a comprehensive document with 3 levels - Do not sail, Master's discretion to sail and no issue with sailing. Had even a single vessel in the fleet been subject to SRtP I would have had to research the regulation and include every potential scenario, in accordance with the regulations, where the vessel couldn't legally sail. Since SRtP came out about 2010, I am surprised the Ship Managers missed including it in the SMS, which would have been developed for Viking Star, prior to 2014. Each of the operational Masters and Chief Engineers cannot possibly be expected to have a detailed working knowledge of every regulation, which is why it is critical that the SMS is comprehensive and continuously updated, to provide the operating crews the correct information required to make informed decisions. Viking Cruises employ the Ship Manager (Wilhelmsen Ship Management) to provide the Masters and Deck/Engineering Officers, and provide the required technical services to manage the vessel. This includes providing a comprehensive SMS and the ISM required Designated Person Ashore (DPA). The DPA apparently did not have sufficient working knowledge of SRtP Regulations and also was lacking in not identifying the Master's failure to report the loss of a DG to Class, who would then report to Flag. It has been many years since I was involved in these details, but in addition to the reporting requirements of the defective engine, the vessel may possibly have required a Class issued, "Condition of Class" prior to sailing. Hopefully the Chief can confirm @chengkp75 Discounting the failure to comply with SRtP Regulations, the decision to sail is highly subjective, and is based on risk assessment, ship's handling characteristics and the experience of the Master and Senior Officers. I believe the Master was an experienced mariner on the Norwegian Coast and he was supported by 2 coast pilots. In a similar situation, as an operational Master with a similar ship in the local Canadian waters I know well, I would have no hesitation with sailing. I have sailed in similar conditions on the coast many, many times without incident. However, the final decision to sail would be based on any SMS restrictions and conducting a risk mitigations to lower the increased risk. The report confirms that the vessel handled the seas well and the conditions were well within the design parameters. Since the root cause of this incident is faulty tank design and low oil levels, had all 4 engines been running, the ship would most likely still have blacked out. With 4 engines, the additional alarms may have increased the troubleshooting time, delaying the time to get 1 DG re-started and synchronised to the main board. Note - even before I retired, more weight was given to pax comfort, as while the ship can easily handle the seas, many pax could not. I don't see any significance in the Master not having considered the option of remaining in port. As a Master, my job was to complete the scheduled sailings, safely and in accordance with the SMS. When I considered options, they were sailing options - depart as scheduled, delay departure, seek safe refuge in deep water, alternative routing, etc. Only when none of those options were safe, would I default to the stay in port. To summarise, personally, I never considered staying in port as 1 of the potential options options, as it was the default, if no option was deemed acceptable.

I'm just heading out for the day, so will endeavour to remember and contribute my thoughts this evening.

Clay, 1. Affirmative, the TA's refundable credits only showed once we boarded the ship 2. Negative, existing optional shore-ex paid pre-cruise with credits or cash were not refunded, so the TA credits could be used. 3. When shore-ex are cancelled for missed ports, or change of plans, the shore-ex cost was returned as a refundable credit (paid pre-cruise by Visa) or non-refundable credit (paid pre-cruise with credits). New onboard optional shore-ex bookings were always charged to refundable credits, if available.

I have booked the prior cruise on that ship, disembarking in Buenos Aires 28th Jan.

While I haven't read the entire report, I started with the conclusions (Section 3) and have read most of Section 1. In the areas I have read so far, the Master's and the crews actions were minor contributing factors compared to others. Tank design - the shipyard designed tanks not complying with SOLAS and OEM guidelines. They further compounded this by installing an ineffective tank monitoring systems. These are not crew issues. Plan Approval - The Flag State has delegated plan approval to Classification Societies, so Lloyd's Register were responsible for checking the shipyard design plans were in accordance with SOLAS and the Flag State (Norway). They were then responsible to approve the plans and ensuring the vessel was built according to said plans. Again, this was not a crew issue. Remote Lub Oil Monitoring System - with fully integrated alarm and monitoring systems, this is a key component of any modern ship. This system was complex and not installed correctly, resulting in the Engineers receiving inaccurate and unreliable data. In this situation, the crew was not provided the correct tools to effectively manage the machinery. Machinery Alarm Panel - modern ships have literally tens of thousands of sensors hooked up to the alarm panel. Modern diesel generators have automatic shut-downs for critical alarms, that include overspeed and loss of lub oil. On my last ships, these critical alarms were grouped separately, so my Chief Engineer could quickly advise why the engine automatically shut down. In the Viking system, they did not register by priority, so the Engineers had to scroll through 1,000 alarms on the screen. Faced with this type of challenge, I'll suggest the engineers did rather well, reasonably quickly identifying the issue and getting an engine restarted. The time interval was considerable, but with less experienced engineers, it could have been longer. Lub Oil Management - this is a potential crew issue, but one must also take into consideration that no definitive minimum levels were provided by the OEM, upon request by another ship. The OEM declined to provide a definitive answer, as the tanks were designed/built by the shipyard and not to OEM recommendations. While the crew should have erred with higher levels, the Designated Person Ashore, should have taken action to solve the issue with the shipyard and OEM. The ship's SMS should have included clearly defined min and max levels for the engineers to follow. Departure Decision - With 1 DG out of service, resulting in failure to comply with SRtP Regulations, the Master should not have sailed, unless he determined a higher risk to the vessel by staying in port, and sailing in accordance with the responsibility outlined in ISM 5.2. However, the constantly changing plethora of International, National and Local Acts and Regulations in the marine industry, make it impossible for every Master to know everything. Masters are provided detailed operational guidelines by the company in the Safety Management System (SMS). Many of the modern SMS include a sailing matrix outlining when the vessel cannot sail, and when it is Master's discretion. The SMS is developed by the Ship Management company and clearly did not include this key requirement. Since cruise ships have routinely shut down an engine for maintenance during normal operations, for many years, this non-compliance with SRtP Regs should have been provided to the Master. Post Incident - When drifting onto a lee shore, the Master quickly deployed both anchors by walking them down, which would be the preferred method. Mayday was issued in a timely manner and pax were mustered by the GES. When Assembly Station B was compromised they moved pax to an alternative location. The Master has effectively utilised the resources available, tasking 1 pilot to the con and another to communications, freeing the Master to focus on the emergency response. In the engine room, considering the system challenges with the alarm system they identified the issue fairly quickly and responded accordingly. Once started, they faced a challenging situation getting the DG's to synchronise with the main board and operated them on manual control. Manual control is practiced, but not a common procedure, so in a stressful environment, the engineers response was effective. With respect to evacuation, the Master correctly identified the risks of launching the survival craft in those seas and in close proximity of the lee shore. As most mariners are well aware, lifeboats have killed more people than have been saved by them. Therefore, while a traumatic experience, a helo evacuation was an excellent option. Yes, in hindsight, the crew could have prevented the incident, but I would hardly refer to them as incompetent. Many ships operate with less competent crews, which could have resulted in a worse outcome.

Thanks, as I haven't got to Section 2 yet. I'll suggest we should first consider the factual statement and NSIA opinion separately. As I noted, being in non-compliance with SRtP Regulations, in most situations, the vessel should not have sailed, as it wasn't fully seaworthy. However, the Master has accountability and responsibility to manage the vessel in accordance with his/her best judgement and experience, with respect to safety and pollution prevention. With an impending significant storm, as per the forecasts, the Master could determine that remaining in port was not safe and heading out to sea was a safer option. The Master's overriding responsibility is outlined in the ISM Code Section 5.2. In accordance with ISM 5.2, that Master must take any action, in their professional judgement, to ensure the safety of the vessel, even if it contravenes the company SMS and regulations. Note - I don't believe the Master used ISM 5.2 to justify sailing, but nothing in the report, I read so far, addresses this clause. When the NSIA mention unacceptable risk due to forecast weather, they are getting away from facts and into subjective decisions. As with all after the fact inquiries, it is easy for the landlubber "Experts", to provide subjective opinions. When I went to sea, these type of positions were filled by experienced mariners, with many years of command experience. Sadly, these days, many are filled by those that can't handle command at sea. I recall reading in Section 1 that the conditions were well within the design criteria of the ship, which is a factual statement. For the NSIA to later state "Unacceptable Risk" shows a complete lack of knowledge of risk analysis. Yes, sailing with only 3 engines, in any weather, results in a potential for increased risk. When the resultant risk of probability and severity reaches a certain level, you either incorporate risk mitigation strategies, to lower the risk, or don't sail. The risk is only unacceptable, if no risk mitigation strategies are used to lower the risk. Did the NSIA state that no risk assessment was completed with no risk mitigations incorporated into the plan prior to sailing? I also note that most of the world's tonnage sail with only 1 engine, 1 propellor and no bow thrusters. Therefore, if the NSIA determined the vessel shouldn't sail due to the weather and having only 3 engines, then every other vessel should not have been sailing.

Water-tight doors are small openings in the major transverse bulkheads that divide the area of a ship below the uppermost continuous deck into water-tight compartments. Most ships are considered 2 compartment vessels, so will remain afloat if 2 compartments are compromised. When open, the water-tight doors permit the crew to move freely through the lower decks of the vessel. When approaching fog, the W/T doors are closed to complete the integrity of the entire transverse bulkheads. So no, water-tight doors would not have prevented the sinking. The reason Andrea Doria sank is the original collision compromised at least 3 compartments, with ships normally designed to withstand damage to 2 compartments. When the hull is compromised and/or the transverse bulkheads damaged, water-tight doors in the damaged area will not save the vessel. If the collision had been at the bow, the Collision Bulkhead may have assisted in limiting the damage to the fore peak and 1 other compartment. This may have saved the ship, provided the water-tight doors below the uppermost continuous deck were closed.

I have only read a few pages of the report, so these are preliminary observations. This incident meets the classic definition of the "Swiss Cheese Model" where numerous issues all aligned. To avoid the incident, all it would have taken is for 1 of the issues to be stopped. Assuming all Viking lub oil sump tanks are the same, this incident started many years before they even started cutting steel on the ship. The tank design not being in compliance with SOLAS is a serious error by the shipyard, which was compounded by Lloyds Register not identifying the deficiency during the plan approval. The Ship Managers not including a sailing restriction for failure to meet the "Safe Return to Port" regulations, when 1 engine is out of service is another significant failure. Ship Manager's "Designated Person Ashore" not following up with the email from one of the ships to the engine manufacturers, when they responded they couldn't provide a definitive answer, as the shipyard designed/built the sump tanks. This is another significant failure. With the exception of the failure to comply with Safe return to Port Regulations, I don't see a problem with the Master's decision to sail, as the report states multiple times the conditions were well within the ship's design criteria. As with most serious incidents, I expect the Lawyers will have a field day. I suspect the Owner probably provided the shipyard with a design/build, which usually contains boilerplate that it will be in accordance with SOLAS and all relevant International/Flag State Regulations. If the tank design is not in accordance with SOLAS, you have a potential breach of contract. Lloyd's Register were also hired by the Owner/Ship Manager to oversee construction and to approve the plans. They again could be in breach of contract. The Master sailed with 1 DG unavailable, which was in contravention of the Safe Return to Port Regulations, potentially rendering the vessel as not being fully seaworthy. Lawyers could potentially make an argument that it could limit the owners limitation of liability.

Especially when they have an almost endless supply of new ships arriving to fill.

Affirmative, ship movement or maintenance are the primary reasons for closing and draining (partially or completely) pools these days,

That was one of the questions I asked in my communication with Viking Corporate in Basle. Sadly no interest.

Back in my cadet days the Captain issued us a challenge to calculate the angle of heel resulting from all pax being on the outer decks, on 1 side of the ship. Memory is a little hazy, but I believe it was about 4 degrees. However, I have never been required to conduct a stability calculation with all pax on the upper decks and have never seen any of the templates provided to the Master showing this scenario. When considering ship stability, as a rule of thumb, weight added above the ship's centre of gravity (CoG) reduces the Metacentric Height (GM), which in laymen's terms reduces stability. Weight added below the CoG increases the GM. The height of any weights added is measured from the Keel and is known as KG. Assuming a ship of about 2,500 pax and 175 lbs per pax, the total weight of pax is about 200 tons. This is a fairly significant weight to add to the upper decks, but in conducting a stability calculation, this is not a new weight, as all 2,500 pax are already onboard. Therefore, any calculation would need to include moving groups from an original KG to a higher KG, with the resultant reduction in GM being less than if you added 200 new tons. Prior to departing on a voyage, the Master must ensure the vessel has an acceptable GM, which allows for the consumption of bunkers, water, victuals, etc and the movement of pax and crew throughout the vessel. Even on longer ocean passages, most ships have sufficient stability to not require dumping of the pools. Back on the steam ships, I have experienced dumping one, or more pools to maintain acceptable stability, but it was due to being low of bunkers and FW, at the end of a long cruise. On the steam ships, at 25+ kts we burned 450 - 500 tons of oil per day, so it quickly reduced the GM, as bunkers were stowed close to the keel.

Don't see any bowls with clotted cream and jam on the table, and where are the fresh scones, which are my favourite part of Afternoon Tea.

I initially advised the L/A Office management clowns over 2 years ago and again last year, regarding the ridiculous statement that Canadians require a US Passport. I guess I shouldn't be surprised that it hasn't changed. You can use this website to research the latest requirements for each port - https://travel.gc.ca/travelling/advisories

I believe they are referencing the 2025 HAL Pole to Pole cruise, which is R/T Ft. Lauderdale.

You need to be steaming due East at over 20 kts to need to change the cloxs 1 hr every day. The Azores is only 5 hrs difference from Galveston and Barcelona is 7 hrs difference. Although the OP didn't mention the length of the cruise, I highly doubt they are sailing to Barcelona in 7 days, with 2 stops. When sailing Eastbound, a number of Masters also change the cloxs at Noon/early afternoon, as it is easier to manage the crew hours of rest. Completed many East/West crossing at 20+ kts, with 1 hr cloxs every night and had no issues with the time difference, unlike air travel.

I'll suggest you are thinking of "Afternoon Tea", which is a different meal than "High Tea" and is also served at a different time. High Tea is a full plated hot meal, which is also served with tea and some treats. It is usually served from 17:00. When I was growing up, this was commonly served in the village pub, where we could have a beer or wine. Afternoon Tea is more common on cruise ships and is a lighter fare, served about 15:00 - 16:00. It includes tea and the triple decker plate of finger sarnies, scones and sweet treats.

Best indoor areas would be Viking, with a fwd lounge spanning 2 decks, a covered main pool and the entire buffet area. With considerably less pax, the viewing areas are generally not crowded.

With respect to wind, you need to consider both the relative wind (not the true wind) and the design of the fwd structure. Relative wind is what is experienced over the decks and is the result of the ships vector and the true wind vector. If the wind is from ahead, then yes, it will be extremely windy over the decks, with the ship's speed adding to the true wind speed. However, if the true wind is from astern or abaft the beam, the ship's speed reduces the true wind speed over the decks. If the wind is right astern and the ship's speed and wind speed are the same, you will not have any wind over the decks. Therefore, wind on a fwd balcony can be variable throughout the entire cruise and will change as the ship alters course. Having spent many hours on open Bridge Wings, even in head winds, the fwd structure deflects the wind, so it is actually fairly calm out on the wings. Had a similar cabin on our Viking World cruise and had no wind issues on the balcony. Haven't sailed with HAL yet, so can't comment on how effective the structure is at deflecting the wind away from balconies. Some other issues you may wish to consider. The increased distance from the ship's centre of gravity means more movement in a seaway, fwd cabins get noise/vibration from the thrusters and may also get noise from the anchor chains in a seaway, plus during anchoring operations. Another consideration for fwd cabins is having to keep the curtains closed from sunset to sunrise, as cabin lights shining fwd, negatively impact the night vision of the Bridge watchkeepers.

Viking had a reasonable Norwegian IPA, a Porter and an Amber Ale. On the World Cruise they also brought on some local craft beers.

In the US they may all work on commission, but that is not consistent throughout the World. Our TA works for an agency and is paid an annual base salary.

I hire a TA similar to my process for hiring employees. First task was developing an SoR on what we want from a TA. For interview candidates, I enlist recommendations from friends and also visit a number of local agencies. Process worked well for us, as since we ceased booking with a cruise line's friends & family program where you must book direct, we have used the same TA for 6 yrs.

Departing Miami to Bermuda, once offshore you may experience the NE Trades, which would be head winds, making it rather windy over the decks. Temps should be reasonably warm. From Bermuda, the prevailing wings are SW'ly, so mostly following winds, so relatively calm over the decks. Temperatures should be reasonable most of the way. In Portugal, I expect temps to be 20C/70F +. All subject to encountering a frontal depression. Chance of experiencing a TRS in May is extremely low.

Weather is always variable and the Atlantic is a huge ocean, so knowing the ports will help in providing an educated guess.

Northbound from Vancouver, the vessel will be entering Queen Charlotte Sound after Helmecken Island around 07:00/08:00 and then it is open water up Hecate Strait. You transit Johnstone Strait at night.