Viking Sky survivors

[OnTheJourney]

I had assumed this class action suit never really went anywhere...interesting to hear it's still in the works. DaveSJ....with your experience, and in your professional opinion...any thoughts on what the result of this might be? Surely Viking, IMHO, has already gone above and beyond in terms of compensation to the passengers. That being said, I cannot speak for - nor begin to even know or understand the feelings of -those who were injured and/or wound up in the hospital immediately after. 

Edited December 6, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[just_dont]

And I thought the cruise contract stipulated that any legal action had to be taken in Switzerland.

Sent from my SM-G955U using Tapatalk

[OnTheJourney]

Yeah...that's what I heard as well shortly after it first came out. 

[Heidi13]

While I am not a lawyer and know nothing of US Law, I have covered International Marine Law in Ship Master's Business. Marine Law is highly specialised and most law firm hire specialised marine experts to advise them.

 

In addition to the cruise contract you also have an IMO Convention for Limitation of Liability for Marine Claims. This originated in the late 50's (Brussels?), but has been updated a couple of times. Basically, you have to prove the ship was unseaworthy to by-pass the limitations.

 

Marine/shipping claims are normally dealt with in Admiralty Court, but not sure if the U.S. has any. In Admiralty Courts, the Lawyers & Judges actually understand International Marine Conventions & Flag State Acts/Regulations.

[DaveSJ711]

Update:  Viking and the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement on November 19, 2019.  The Notice indicates that they have reached a settlement agreement in principle.  They say they will file formal settlement documents with the court on or before December 20, 2019.  The judge has approved this schedule.

 

I don't think it's a coincidence that the settlement came right after the Norwegian authorities filed their interim report.

[DGHOC]

7 hours ago, DaveSJ711 said:

Update:  Viking and the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement on November 19, 2019.  The Notice indicates that they have reached a settlement agreement in principle.  They say they will file formal settlement documents with the court on or before December 20, 2019.  The judge has approved this schedule.

 

I don't think it's a coincidence that the settlement came right after the Norwegian authorities filed their interim report.

 

Thank you Dave for your informed posts. I have no understanding of these sorts of legalities or the US legal system. Are you suggesting that the class action hasn't been pursued and that Viking are negotiating a settlement solely with the couple from New York?

[OnTheJourney]

DGHOC....good question, and one I was also going to ask. 

 

DaveSJ - I also thank you for these updates, since this is the first I've heard of any additional proceedings beyond that of the initial mentioning of there being a suit. I also know absolutely nothing of the litigation technicalities that may surround this instance, but I'm surprised that both sides would not have waited until the final report comes out before arriving at a resolution. Apparently the interim report presented enough information. 

 

Changing the subject for a moment - I thought that we would hear something further from Viking at this point regarding the 1/18/21 cruise, since it's not much more than a year away. 

Edited December 6, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[OnTheJourney]

Regarding the lawsuit - I was never asked to sign anything, so is the suit automatically on behalf of all the passengers (and crew?) or just the Freudmanns and others who may have been injured? 

[DaveSJ711]

The settlement agreement won't be limited to the named plaintiffs (the Freudmanns).  The Notice calls for the plaintiffs to file a motion to certify a class.  Like the settlement itself, the motion is due on or before December 20.  How broad or how narrow the class will be isn't specified.  (I assume the class will include all Sky passengers.)  Once the judge certifies the class and approves the settlement, Sky passengers will receive some sort of notice as to their rights under the settlement.

[DaveSJ711]

Because I'm not involved in the case, I can only speculate as to why the parties didn't wait to settle until the final report came out.  But here's my guess.  First, the interim report was pretty damning by itself.  The difference between recommended and actual oil levels was dramatic.  I don't know why there was such a difference, or whether that difference was a one-off or standard policy on Viking vessels (for whatever reason).  In any event, I'm sure Viking didn't want more bad facts to come out and affect the course of the litigation.  Much better to cut losses and do a deal, now.

 

Second, the interim report cut right to the chase -- the low oil level caused the loss of propulsion, which in turn caused the mayday and near-grounding, which in turn caused the mass evacuation.  All of those facts tie back to Viking.  In a lawsuit, it's critical that a plaintiff establish a causal link between the alleged negligence and the resulting damages.  The interim report established this link.  What the final report says will simply reinforce this key fact.

 

Third, from everything I know about Viking (including what I've read about the incident), it would not be in the company's character to adopt a take-no-prisoners approach to the litigation, especially when the facts are so troublesome for Viking.  The company went out of its way to accommodate passengers right after the incident.  It would be inconsistent for Viking, now, to pour cold water on passengers who are trying to hold the company to account.   

[OnTheJourney]

Dave...very well explained. It all makes sense. Thanks so much for this. I'm sure many here on CC appreciate the updated info. As a pure layman in terms of having so little knowledge of such matters, I must admit to agreeing completely that the interim report pretty much seals the deal as to presenting a degree of culpability (especially with regards to the oil levels). However, much has been said here on CC relative to all this. While the oil levels were indeed low, I seem to recall info presented here indicating that, were it not for sailing into such adverse conditions which directly caused the blackout due to the excessive degree of ship motion, it's conceivable that there was enough oil to continue and perhaps even complete the voyage. Much remains unanswered in the report. I have to wonder if there was a plan to replenish the oil supply at some point. Then, of course, it would seem an even larger issue is the decision to stick to the intended course given the forecast. It seems many of the unanswered questions - at least relative to the lawsuit - are almost moot if indeed a settlement is already underway. 

Edited December 6, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[JDincalif]

On 12/6/2019 at 1:21 PM, OnTheJourney said:

Dave...very well explained. It all makes sense. Thanks so much for this. I'm sure many here on CC appreciate the updated info. As a pure layman in terms of having so little knowledge of such matters, I must admit to agreeing completely that the interim report pretty much seals the deal as to presenting a degree of culpability (especially with regards to the oil levels). However, much has been said here on CC relative to all this. While the oil levels were indeed low, I seem to recall info presented here indicating that, were it not for sailing into such adverse conditions which directly caused the blackout due to the excessive degree of ship motion, it's conceivable that there was enough oil to continue and perhaps even complete the voyage. Much remains unanswered in the report. I have to wonder if there was a plan to replenish the oil supply at some point. Then, of course, it would seem an even larger issue is the decision to stick to the intended course given the forecast. It seems many of the unanswered questions - at least relative to the lawsuit - are almost moot if indeed a settlement is already underway. 

 

[JDincalif]

Oops! I sent the above quote from On The Journey before writing my piece and connecting my piece to that quote. Sorry about that.

What I want to say in support of On The Journey's comments is that we have learned that other shipping lines were well aware of the bomb cyclone that was about to hit the Norwegian Sea well before the bad weather hit. In September of this year we traveled back to Norway - this time much by land and a little at sea. We talked to a couple people who were involved in the rescue operations and we took a three day journey aboard a Hurtigruten ferry. We learned that Hurtigruten had ordered all their vessels in the area to be in port during the storm and that the vessel we were on was docked in port from Friday, March 22 to Tuesday, March 26. We also learned from crew members aboard the Hurtigruten ferry that satellite photos identified the possibility and probability of such a storm many hours before the tempest hit. Decisions were made by Viking to travel on and with the low oil levels a tragedy occurred. 

We are impressed with how Viking is handling the fall out from this situation and we look forward to traveling with the cruise line in the future. We do look forward to reconnecting with all of our fellow survivors who will be on the new ship's inaugural voyage in January 2021. That voyage will be an emotional but well needed event and will be part of the healing process.

[DaveSJ711]

The class action lawsuit highlighted the weather forecast and the Hurtigruten's decision to stay in port.  Whether the Sky should have done likewise is beyond my pay grade. 

 

While the weather issue may soon be moot for purposes of the lawsuit (due to the pending settlement), it's not moot for purposes of the final report by the Norwegian authorities.  It will be interesting to see if that report opines on whether the Sky should have done what the Hurtiguten did, especially given the Sky's low oil levels, the presence of extensive shoals, and the DG3 outage.    

[OnTheJourney]

At the risk of stirring up contrary opinions on all this - since much has already been said - I have to agree with JD especially after his experience of actually speaking to Hurtigruten crew regarding the March event. Given the technology available, I highly suspect the Sky (and probably the home office that they undoubtedly consult with relative to making alternative sailing decisions in the event of unusual or difficult circumstances) knew about the forecasted storm not just "many hours" but probably at least a day or two in advance. I seem to recall it said somewhere along the line that during a tour of the bridge some passengers even saw the approaching storm on the screens. No idea however as to the accuracy of that. Given that Hurtigruten stayed in port, however, it would appear as though there was perhaps more to be lost than gained by the Sky continuing on her intended course. I had also heard (another unfounded 'grapevine' tale perhaps) that there was some degree of urgency to get to London on time - don't recall all the particulars. 

 

JD expressed the thought very well as to the inaugural sailing likely being a rather emotional and "well needed" event. I agree with this also. I have to wonder how severely Viking would have been impacted had the "tragedy" been elevated to that of a worst-case scenario where perhaps hundreds - or more - might have perished had the ship foundered on the rocks. I suppose it's conceivable that something of that magnitude could almost cripple any cruise line.

 

I think I may have already mentioned - if not on this thread than another - that I was just on a cruise that encountered two storm systems. Certainly neither were on the scale as the bomb cyclone; however, I was most impressed at how the captain kept us well informed days ahead of time as to the impending conditions. He explained the reasoning for changing course twice to avoid potential complications. I'll always remember him saying "this is not an adventure ship" and that maintaining the best possible safety is paramount over all else. Granted that we lost 2 ports (but added another one in place of one lost and stayed an extra day at an already scheduled port), but he pointed out during two excellent presentations in the ship's theatre how the conditions would have been compared to what we actually experienced by making course corrections. It was most impressive how he put up many different slides and graphs explaining everything. My thoughts kept going back to the March event and I was nagged by the realization that at NO time - to the best of my knowledge - were the passengers informed of any bad (let alone severe) weather conditions ahead. I believe this point was recently brought up either here or on another thread that deals with the Sky. 

 

Being of a religious persuasion, I hazard to say - and I do believe this in my heart - that there were powers at work beyond that of what the engines, crew, tugboats, helicopters, etc. were able to achieve. We can be so thankful. 

Edited December 7, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[Heidi13]

I know I have mentioned it before, but comparing a ferry operation to a cruise ship is similar to comparing apples to oranges. Having worked cruise ships and spent years in command of Ro/Pax ferries, I have spent many days secured at the dock and watched deep sea ships safely navigating.

 

Ferries handle differently than cruise ships and their cargo is both difficult to secure and lethal when it breaks free. The Hurtigruten Safety Management System will have operational limits in their procedures, which will be similar to my last company. On high sided, low draft cruise ships, being in port is potentially higher risk than being at sea in extreme wind.

 

Being in port, when the lines start breaking in a storm, is no fun and is significantly more risk than being in the open ocean. Sadly, I know this from experience and similar to the Viking incident was extremely lucky that the wind stopped before we ran out of lines.

[JDincalif]

Heidi 13, as usual your comments and knowledge are so very informative. Thank you for this insight.

[DGHOC]

Whilst we were totally stunned by the report's admission that one of the large DGs was out of action two days into our journey, and that we'd entered the storm like that, another thing that confused us was the oil levels mentioned in the interim report. See quote below. It was discussed here on CC soon after the event that they were low but within recommended limits, perhaps though those were limits set by the ship builders? Can't seem to put my hands on the discussed detail. Two different sets of limits from two different sources? 

 

The lubricating oil sump tanks of all the diesel generators were maintained at 28%–40% capacity. MAN’s recommendation was to maintain them at 68%–75% capacity.

 

Thanks again Heidi13 for your informed rational posts. We'd had similar conversations with folk in Molde about how larger ships handle the water differently. Has to be said though that they universally believed that the ship would ground thus their delight and support as we sailed into port. Enormous relief for all of us onboard but also for the folk cheering us from the shoreline too! 

 

JD it sounds like you had a fab trip back to Norway. We'd really like to do it again and see all we missed, stunning country with wonderful people! 

 

Thanks DaveSJ711, your posts are food for thought! You are our official legal interpreter!

 

[dogs4fun]

17 hours ago, OnTheJourney said:

We can be so thankful. 

amen

[Heidi13]

10 hours ago, DGHOC said:

Whilst we were totally stunned by the report's admission that one of the large DGs was out of action two days into our journey, and that we'd entered the storm like that, another thing that confused us was the oil levels mentioned in the interim report. See quote below. It was discussed here on CC soon after the event that they were low but within recommended limits, perhaps though those were limits set by the ship builders? Can't seem to put my hands on the discussed detail. Two different sets of limits from two different sources? 

 

The lubricating oil sump tanks of all the diesel generators were maintained at 28%–40% capacity. MAN’s recommendation was to maintain them at 68%–75% capacity.

 

Thanks again Heidi13 for your informed rational posts. We'd had similar conversations with folk in Molde about how larger ships handle the water differently. Has to be said though that they universally believed that the ship would ground thus their delight and support as we sailed into port. Enormous relief for all of us onboard but also for the folk cheering us from the shoreline too! 

 

JD it sounds like you had a fab trip back to Norway. We'd really like to do it again and see all we missed, stunning country with wonderful people! 

 

Thanks DaveSJ711, your posts are food for thought! You are our official legal interpreter!

 

Thinking back to that dreadful day, when reviewing the AIS with the drift rate, it is a miracle the ship didn't ground. Some exceptional basic seamanship from the Captain and the timely return of 1 DG, with at least limited power, saved the day. Seeing the chartlet, included in the interim report, confirmed it was a miracle she didn't ground, especially considering the shoals and the seaway.

 

A couple of days after the incident, the Norwegian Authorities issued a Notice to Shipping regarding owners checking oil levels. If I recall correctly, it mentioned that Viking's ship manager, who has control of Deck & Engineering Operations, had already promulgated the information to their fleet of managed vessels. Therefore, the fact that a delta existed between actual & recommended oil levels was common knowledge, well before the issuance of the interim report. I also note that these reports are provided to the owner for comments and request for changes about 1 month before they are issued.

 

I believe the only new information I received in the Interim Report was the actual percentages of actual & recommended levels. While the final report will not find fault, when it answers all the why's, it will greatly assist in determining liability for this incident. A number of key facts were conspicuous by their absence, a couple of which are:

• Was the OEM levels included in the report readily available on the ship
• What were the recommended levels included in the Ship Manager's SMS that the on-board crew were using 
• Were any contributing factors present for the low levels.

The answers to these questions should be in the final report.

[DaveSJ711]

Heidi13, in your experience, who within a ship's chain of command would be responsible for verifying proper oil levels before and during sailing?  And why would a cruise ship sail in the first place with the huge "delta" you describe?  For comparison, if my car's engine block freezes up because I don't add oil, then that's on me.  I can't imagine any factors that would mitigate my responsibility as a vehicle owner.

 

Similarly, the "delta" is so large here that I can't imagine any mitigating factors here that would let Viking off the hook.  And if the "delta" was common knowledge to Viking's ship management, then they were on notice that the delta existed -- yet nothing was done about it.

 

I agree that we'll learn more in the final report, e.g., whether this sort of problem existed on other Viking ships prior to the incident.  That would not be a good fact to come out.

[DGHOC]

Looking at that chart still makes our blood run cold Heidi13, I agree, we were desperately lucky! My poor kids were besides themselves watching this unfold. 

 

I totally agree the Captain and crew saved the day, thank goodness for their skilled handling of the situation, we are forever in their debt. As for the whys and the wherefores, we await the final report. There is absolutely no point in wild conjecture, no benefit to anyone. A true evaluation of what took place is needed by all who experienced this event in the hope that lessons will be learnt and it won't be repeated.

[OnTheJourney]

4 hours ago, Heidi13 said:

 it is a miracle the ship didn't ground.

 

Well, given that there has now been reference to a "miracle" as having saved us (and I agree), I hold firmly to the belief there was more at work on our behalf than just the actions of the captain and crew, especially considering that we came so close to a real disaster and yet not even a single fatality. I also believe that everything happens for a reason, so, yes, hopefully there are lessons that have been learned from this. 

[Heidi13]

8 hours ago, DaveSJ711 said:

Heidi13, in your experience, who within a ship's chain of command would be responsible for verifying proper oil levels before and during sailing?  And why would a cruise ship sail in the first place with the huge "delta" you describe?  For comparison, if my car's engine block freezes up because I don't add oil, then that's on me.  I can't imagine any factors that would mitigate my responsibility as a vehicle owner.

 

Similarly, the "delta" is so large here that I can't imagine any mitigating factors here that would let Viking off the hook.  And if the "delta" was common knowledge to Viking's ship management, then they were on notice that the delta existed -- yet nothing was done about it.

 

I agree that we'll learn more in the final report, e.g., whether this sort of problem existed on other Viking ships prior to the incident.  That would not be a good fact to come out.

The responsibility for ensuring all machinery is operational, in accordance with the company's Safety Management System is the Senior Engineering Officer of the Watch. He/she is then responsible to the Chief Engineer, who oversees the entire Engineering Plant. When equipment is non-operational to the required standard the SMS will have clear reporting procedures.

 

As a Captain, I had no idea the quantity of oil in each M/E Lub Oil Tank, but prior to commencing daily operations I had a call with the Chief Engineer when we would discuss the status of the Engine Room, especially any deficiencies and how they could impact the safe operation of the vessel. The Chief Engineer makes recommendations and the Master can accept them, or decide an alternative option. I will also discuss any potential operational risks with the Chief Engineer - weather, current, traffic (fishing fleet), etc.

 

Drilling down to determine why the oil level were so low can be a long process, as depending on answers provided to the initial questions, the investigators may end up drilling down multiple levels, and opening multiple new avenues of investigation. Personally, with the level of detail provided in the SMS of my previous company, I find it beyond comprehension how they could be so low. I am not aware of any facts being posted that would assist in determining why they were so low, nor who could be responsible.

 

In addition to thoroughly investigating the reasons for low oil, I expect to see feedback on the Ship Manager's SMS. While approved by Flag/Class, is it consistent with the standards of other cruise ship operators. Most cruise lines and major ferry companies have SMS's significantly above the minimum standards outlined in the ISM Code.

 

If these operational levels were in accordance with the Ship Manager's SMS, then in all probability they were used by all vessels managed by this Ship Manager, which includes the entire Viking Fleet. However, I expect this will be covered in the final report.

[GeezerCouple]

1 hour ago, Heidi13 said:

The responsibility for ensuring all machinery is operational, in accordance with the company's Safety Management System is the Senior Engineering Officer of the Watch. He/she is then responsible to the Chief Engineer, who oversees the entire Engineering Plant. When equipment is non-operational to the required standard the SMS will have clear reporting procedures.

 

As a Captain, I had no idea the quantity of oil in each M/E Lub Oil Tank, but prior to commencing daily operations I had a call with the Chief Engineer when we would discuss the status of the Engine Room, especially any deficiencies and how they could impact the safe operation of the vessel. The Chief Engineer makes recommendations and the Master can accept them, or decide an alternative option. I will also discuss any potential operational risks with the Chief Engineer - weather, current, traffic (fishing fleet), etc.

 

Drilling down to determine why the oil level were so low can be a long process, as depending on answers provided to the initial questions, the investigators may end up drilling down multiple levels, and opening multiple new avenues of investigation. Personally, with the level of detail provided in the SMS of my previous company, I find it beyond comprehension how they could be so low. I am not aware of any facts being posted that would assist in determining why they were so low, nor who could be responsible.

 

In addition to thoroughly investigating the reasons for low oil, I expect to see feedback on the Ship Manager's SMS. While approved by Flag/Class, is it consistent with the standards of other cruise ship operators. Most cruise lines and major ferry companies have SMS's significantly above the minimum standards outlined in the ISM Code.

 

If these operational levels were in accordance with the Ship Manager's SMS, then in all probability they were used by all vessels managed by this Ship Manager, which includes the entire Viking Fleet. However, I expect this will be covered in the final report.

 

What is a [reasonable] reason for allowing the oil to get so low?

 

Assuming one would need to top it off more frequently, wouldn't approximately the same amount of oil be used regardless of the frequency?

Is there significant down time associated with refilling?  Crew time?

 

GC